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1. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence
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contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed,
(2) Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc. ("PMRI") could not have been the beneficiary
of the trust in 1965 because it did not exist until 1973, and (3) the extrinsic
evidence of the plat does not prove that a trust actually existed.
2. Assuming it was a trust beneficiary, PMRI was not in "privity
of estate" for purposes of covenants running with the land because
2

29

Security Title owned the land in fee simple estate.
3. PMRI was (1) not in "mutual privity" because the covenants

33

did not arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner of the
same parcel of land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it didiiot
convey the land to a person who agreed to be bound by the covenants,
and (3) not in "vertical privity" because it did not convey land to Plaintiff/
Appellant's predecessor in interest.
4. The holding of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower

36

Mountain Fonds (that inferences drawn from recorded documents are no
substitute for a recorded deed), applies in this case because the Utah
Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act make no distinction
between title and other interests in real property.
5. Under the Utah general law of trusts, the beneficiary does not
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have the power to encumber or otherwise dispose of the assets held by
the trustee.
6. The 1973 CC&R's are unenforceable under the doctrine of
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uniformity because they only cover Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, and
not the rest of the 1,200 acres that they purport to cover.
7. The trial court was mistaken in concluding that "Plaintiffs
3
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predecessors in interest" had agreed to the 1973 CC&R's, and even
if one of them had so agreed, that agreement would be unenforceable
under the Utah Statute of Frauds and void under the Utah Recording Act.
CONCLUSION
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12. 1984 Deed frrom Ryan to Mountainland Properties, R0211.
13. 1985 Deed from Mountainland Properties to Blanchard, R0213.
14. 1999 Deed from Blanchard to Plaintiff Peters, R0215.
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15. The Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22, 2004 in the companion
case, Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Ass'n, L.L.C. v.
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass 'n, Appellate Case No. 200430397 - CA.
[This Ruling and Order appears in the record of the companion case at
R00366-382].
16. 1980 Notice of Lien, R0232.
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 2 - 2 (3) (j) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Under the doctrine of descriptio personae, if the word "trustee" appears
after the name of the grantee in a deed conveying approximately 4,264.68 acres
and there is no contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed, but there is
extrinsic evidence that - (1) eight years after the deed, a new corporation was
formed, (2) that new corporation executed and recorded covenants, conditions and
restrictions ("CC&R's) against about a quarter of the real property conveyed by
the earlier deed, (3) in the CC&R's, the new corporation declares that it "is the
owner of or intends to acquire" the property covered by the CC&R's, (4) in the
CC&R's there is no reference to a trust or trust beneficiary, (5) three years later
the new corporation signed the "owner's dedication" on a subdivision plat partly
7

located in the area purportedly covered by the CC&R's, and (6) a note on that plat
refers to the corporation as the "subdivider" and as owning and being responsible
for the maintenance of the streets - as a matter of law, is that corporation the
beneficiary of a trust of which the trust res was the 4,264.68 acres?
2. Under the Utah judicial requirements for covenants to run with the land,
is there "privity of estate" between the beneficiary of a trust and the grantee of the
trustee of that trust with respect to lots carved out of the real property which was
the trust res?
3. Under Utah general law of trusts, does a trust beneficiary have the power
to dispose of the real property held by the trustee for his benefit in the trust (as
opposed to his beneficial interest in the trust)?
4. Under the Utah doctrine of uniformity, are CC&R's that bind only part of
the area they purport to cover binding at all?
5. Does contract law provide an alternative way to create legally
enforceable CC&R's without the formalities of written documents, signatures,
notarial acknowledgments and recordation?
Standard of Review: This is an appeal from the granting and denial of
cross motions for summary judgment. In this situation, the standard of review is
to review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to the trial court,
8

Grynberg v. Questar Pipleline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6; Surety
Underwriters v.E&C

Trucking, Inc. , 2000 UT 71, para. 14, 10 P.3d 338, 340.

CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUES WERE PRESERVED
1. "Descriptio Personae". In the record of Forest Meadows, R00378
("Ruling and Order").
2. Privity of Estate. In the record of Forest Meadows, R00379 ("Ruling
and Order").
3. Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. In the record of
Forest Meadows, R0378.
4. Uniformity. R0426-451 ("Mem. in Supp. 2d Mo. for S.J.").
5. Use of Contract Law to Create Enforceable CC&R's. R0419 ("Ruling
and Order").

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. sec. 25 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds.")
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing."

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect.")
9

a.

A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record.")
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff originally brought this action as the petitioner in a summary
proceeding under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. see's.
38 - 9 - 1 et seq.. ROOOl. The trial court dismissed the summary proceeding with
prejudice, but permitted the action to proceed as an action to quiet title under Utah
Code Ann. sec. 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 . R0149. In the quiet title action, Plaintiff claims that
two recorded documents, identified in this action as "the 1973 CC&R's" and "the
1980 Notice of Lien," are invalid clouds on his title (in effect, wrongful liens) on
his Lot 6 in Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, Summit County, Utah. R0157-164.
The background of this action is:
On October 14, 1965, F.E. Bates and his wife Mae P. Bates deeded a large
10

tract of land in Summit County, approximately 4,264.68 acres, by warranty deed to
"Security Title Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah." There is no
contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed or, if a trust did exist, of
who its beneficiary was. A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Document "1" in the
Addendum. R0202.
Eight years later, on August 15, 1973, W. Brent Jensen, purporting to act as
the president of 'Tine Meadow Ranch " executed and acknowledged in corporate
form a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" ("CC&R's) for
part of the area covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately 1,200 acres out of
approximately 4,264.68.) These 1973 CC&R's were recorded on September 28,
1973. A copy of the 1973 CC&R's is Document "3" in the Addendum. R0221230.
At the time Mr. Jensen executed the 1973 CC&R's (August 15, 1973), Pine
Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") did not exist. It was incorporated on August 22,
1973. A copy of the first page of its Articles of Incorporation is Document "2" in
the Addendum. R0358. There is a letter in the file from the Utah Department of
Commerce showing that Mr. Jensen had been using "Pine Meadow Ranch"
previously as a trade name. R0362.
In the 1973 CC&R's, Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") declares:
11

"WHEREAS declarant is the owner of or intends to acquire certain property
in Summit County, State of Utah, which is more particularly described as:
The South one-half of section 16; the East half of the Southeast
quarter of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 20; All
of Section 21; all in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian (containing approximately l,200acres)^-R0221.
There is no mention of a trust in the declaration and PMRI does not describe itself
as the beneficiary of a trust. PMRI does not declare that it owns the property in
question or that it has a beneficial interest in it but that it "is the owner of or
intends to acquire" the property. PMRI actually declares its non-ownership, and
nothing in the real estate records shows that it later acquired ownership of the
property described in the declaration.
The declaration covers only roughly 1,200 acres of the 4,264.68 acres
covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. Most importantly, by including "all of Section
21" in this declaration, PMRI is purporting to impose the 1973 CC&R's on the
western portion of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D (the subdivision involved in the
companion case). But, in the companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners
Ass'n, etc., the trial court ruled, based on the evidence of the Plat for Forest
Meadow Ranch Plat D, that this same land was owned by Security Title Company
as trustee for the benefit of Deseret Diversified Development, a corporation
formed in 1971. A copy of the trial court's ruling and order is Document "15" in
12

the Addendum. The inconsistency is glaring.
On May 6, 1976, "Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 'D'" was recorded at the
Summit County Recorder's office. R0204-205. The "Owner's Dedication" on the
plat reads as follows:
"OWNER'S DEDICATION
"Know all men by these presents that
, the
undersigned owner
( ) of the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided
into lots and streets to be hereafter known as the
PINE MEADOW RANCH. PLAT "D"
do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this
plat as intended for public use.
"In witness whereof
have hereunto set
this
day of
,A.D. 19
PINE MEADOW RANCH
/s/ W. Brent Jensen
1st Zella J. Jensen
Wesley Brent Jensen
Zella J. Jensen
President
Secretary
SECURITY TITLE CO., TRUSTEE
/s/ Gordon H. Dick
I si Nancy H. Barlette
Exec Vice President
Asst, Secretary"
The following "Subdividers Note" appears on the plat:
"SUBDIVIDERS NOTE
"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and
streets or rights of way to public. It is intended that alia streets shown hereon shall
remain the property of the subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be
completely maintained by said owner.

13

/s/ W. Brent Jensen
W. Brent Jensen"
In this "Subdivided s Note," the omission of the word "Inc." in the name
"Pine Meadows Ranch" and the personal form of signature ("W. Brent Jensen" as
opposed to "Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., by W. Brent Jensen, president77) combined
with the fact that Mr. W. Brent Jensen was using "Pine Meadow Ranch" as his
personal dba, R0362, mean that the note on its face refers to Mr. Jensen personally
and not to PMRI, the corporation.
Nothing on the plat makes reference to a trust and PMRI does not describe
itself as the beneficiary of a trust. Nor does Mr. W. Brent Jensen describe himself
as the beneficiary of a trust. The plat contains no language of conveyance by
which Security Title conveys anything to PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen.
On December 31, 1979, PMRI was dissolved for failing to file its annual
report. R0381-383.
After the recordation of the plat created the lots, the history of Lot 6 is as
follows:
(1) On July 7, 1977, Security Title Company, Trustee, conveyed Lot 6, Pine
Meadow Ranch Plat "D," to Mountainland Properties, Inc., by special warranty
deed, recorded July 15, 1997. Document "9" in the Addendum. R0207.

14

(2) On August 4, 1980, Mountainland Properties, Inc., conveyed Lot 6 to
John F. Ryan by special warranty deed, recorded August 5, 1980. Document "11"
in the Addendum. R0209.
(3) On October 24, 1984, John Ryan and his wife, Walleen-Ryan, conveyed
Lot 6 by warranty deed to Mountainland Properties, Inc., recorded October 29,
1984. Document "12" in the Addendum. R0211.
(4) On October 25, 1984, Mountainland Properties conveyed Lot 6 by
special warranty deed to Raymond R. Blanchard, recorded March 29, 1985.
Document "13" in the Addendum. R0213.
(5) On January 19, 1999, Raymond R. Blanchard conveyed Lot 6 by
warranty deeded to Plaintiff, Paul H. Peters, recorded January 20, 1999.
Document "14" in the Addendum. R0215.
PMRI does not appear in this chain of title. There is no deed, contract, or
other document in the record whereby anyone in the chain of title agrees to impose
thel973CC&R'sonLot6.
On July 25, 1980, Defendant recorded against Lot 6 a "Notice of Lien" by
which it gave notice that it claimed liens against Lot 6 under the 1973 CC&R's
"for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share fees,
special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any or all of said items"
15

("1980 Notice of Lien."). R0232.
On November 4, 1987, Pine Meadow Ranch Plats E, F, G and I were
recorded, with the following persons signing the "Owner's Dedication" in those
plats:
Plat E

Security Title Company Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
Pres. and Charles G. Miller, Sec.
C. Mike Nielson
Earl Clayton and Margaret Clayton

Plat F

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres. and Charles G. Miller, sec.
Herbert Rij and Renate Rij

Plat G

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres and Charles G. Miller, sec.
Max E. Bangerter
Howells, Inc. by Bobby G. Waggoner, vice pres.
Larry LeRoy Smith and Sybil Burton Smith

Plat I

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres., and Charles A. Miller, sec.

Plats E, F, and G (but not I) contain "Road Dedication Notes" that read as
follows:
"Road Dedication Notes
"The owners hereof hereby acknowledge the judgment of the Court in Case
Number 6181 in the District Court for Summit County as to certain private surface
rights of passage over the road depicted on the foregoing plat and that Summit
County has no responsibility for improvement or maintenance of such roads;
provided however that title to the surface easement and subsurface of the roads
16

depicted for this plat is held by the Pine Meadow Ranch Owners Association for
conveyance and sale in the future to be maintained by the Pine Meadow Special
Service District."
There is no language of conveyance on the plats conveying any interest in
the roads to Defendant Pine Meadow Ranch Owners Association.—PMRI had been
dissolved on December 31, 1979, eight years before the recordation of these plats.
On December 1, 1999, Plaintiff brought this action as Petitioner under the
Utah Wrongful Lien Statute to have the 1973 CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of
Lien declared wrongful liens under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. The trial
court dismissed the petition with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed as a
quiet title action. This is why Plaintiff is "Plaintiff and not "Petitioner."
In the spring of 2000, the Special Service District in the area that had been
maintaining the roads with taxes collected from district property owners was
dissolved. Defendant then for the first time began to make assessments against the
lots in the Pine Meadows Ranch and the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment based on the fact that PMRI
did not have any interest of record in the land when it recorded the 1973 CC&R's.1

1

Plaintiff concedes that since PMRI was incorporated on August 22, 1973,
and it recorded the 1973 CC&R's on September 28, 1973, five weeks later, PMRI
"adopted" the 1973 CC&R's and the fact that it did not exist when Mr. W. Brent
Jensen signed the 1973 CC&R's does not mean they are invalid.
17

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the grounds that PMRI
was the beneficiary of a trust in which Security Title held the land covered by the
1973 CC&R's as trustee for its benefit, and, as the beneficiary, had the power to
bind the land with covenants running with the land.
The trial court, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, denied Plaintiffs motion
and granted Defendant's cross motion. In the trial court's ruling and order, the
judge makes reference to his Ruling and Order in the companion case, Forest
Meadow Property Owners Ass'n, etc. A copy of that ruling and order is included
as Document "15" in the Addendum.
Plaintiff then brought a second motion for summary judgment based on the
doctrine of uniformity - that CC&R's are unenforceable if they do not apply in a
reasonably uniform manner. R0424-425. Plaintiff argued that if the note and
owner's dedication on Plat D make PMRI the trust beneficiary, then the notes and
owner's dedications on plats E, F, G and I make other people the trust
beneficiaries too, and since those other people did not sign the 1973 CC&R's,
they are unenforceable in the areas covered by those plats, rendering them nonuniform. The trial court denied this motion and entered judgment for Defendant,
R0479-481, and this appeal timely followed.

18

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff/Appellant's arguments are based on statutes and judicial doctrines
— chiefly the Utah Statute of Frauds and the judicial doctrine of descriptio
personae - but, behind these arguments is a deeper policy argument- that the
underlying purpose of these statutes and judicial doctrines is to let the real estate
market rely on the records kept by the County Recorders.
For example, Plaintiffs first argument is that the 1973 CC&R's are invalid
because they were not signed by the owner of the property - "Security Title
Company, Trustee," but by a stranger to the title, PMRI. This argument is framed
in terms of the doctrine of descriptio personae - that the word "trustee" after the
name of a grantee, standing alone will be disregarded in the absence of extrinsic
evidence proving a trust existed, with the grantee taking the land in its own right.
"Descriptio personae" is Latin, and this makes the doctrine seem abstract
and stilted, but the doctrine deals with a practical problem: "if the extrinsic
evidence does not show a trust existed, how can people be confident they can get
good title from the owner of record?"
The trial court held as a matter of law that the extrinsic evidence of the 1976
plat proves as a matter of law that a trust existed and that PMRI was its
beneficiary. Plaintiff argues that this was error. The 1965 Bates Deed was given
19

in 1965. Defendant must show by extrinsic evidence that a trust existed in 1965.
PMRI did not even exist until it was incorporated on August 22, 1973, eight years
later. PMRI does not describe itself as a trust beneficiary in the 1973CC&R's.
The 1973 CC&R's only cover a fraction of the land covered by the4965 Bates
Deed. The plat, recorded in 1976, does not describe PMRI as a trust beneficiary or
mention a trust. There is no record of anyone conveying any interest in the
property or in any trust to PMRI. PMRI was dissolved on December 31, 1979,
with no record of its conveying its supposed beneficial interest in the trust to
anyone. Plaintiff makes more factual points, but behind these is the deeper
question: "would a reasonable person - looking at the recorded documents and
seeing that PMRI had no interest of record - actually believe on the basis of the
"owner's dedication" and the "subdivider's note" on the plat, that PMRI was a
trust beneficiary of a trust holding title to the land covered by the plat?"
Plaintiffs second argument assumes that this Court rejects his first
argument and agrees with the trial court that PMRI was the beneficiary of a trust
of which Security Title was the trustee whose res was the land shown on plat D.
Plaintiff argues that PMRI as a trust beneficiary did not have the "estate"
necessary for it to have "privity of estate" in any of the forms necessary to bind the
land with covenants running with the land. "Privity of estate" is technical
20

language. Ordinary people do not use the word "privity of estate" in their
everyday conversation. But, beneath this technical language is the deeper question
of whether the law should permit land to be bound by permanent covenants
running with the land by anyone other than the owner of the fee simple estate.
Plaintiffs third argument assumes that the Court has decided that people
with less than a fee simple estate can impose permanent covenants running with
the land on land. Plaintiff then argues that under the Utah general law of trusts
(as it was in 1973), the beneficiary of a trust had no power of disposition over the
assets held in trust, but only a power of disposition over his beneficial interest in
the trust. Plaintiff argues that only the trustee, Security Title, had the power to
impose the CC&R's and it did not sign them. Again, behind this technical
argument is a deeper argument. If the beneficiary of a trust has a power of
disposition over the assets held in trust (as opposed to a power of disposition over
his beneficial interest in the trust), the trustee will not be able to control the assets.
The beneficiary's power of control will lead to traditional spendthrift trusts failing,
the assets in traditional spendthrift trusts becoming vulnerable in bankruptcy, and
to trusts becoming subject to the "grantor trust" provisions of the Federal income
tax law.
Plaintiffs fourth argument, assuming the Court rejects the first three, is that
21

the lack of uniformity produced by the 1973 CC&R's applying only to Pine
Meadows Plats "A," B," "C," and "D," and not to Plats "E," "F," "G," "I", and the
unplatted land covered by the 1973 CC&R's, renders them unenforceable even as
to Plat "D."
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that enforceable
CC&R's can be imposed on land under contract law without the formalities of
written instruments, signatures, notarial acknowledgments and recordation.
ARGUMENTS
1. Descriptio personae applies because (1) there is no evidence
contemporaneous with the 1965 Bates Deed that a trust actually existed, (2)
PMRI could not have been the beneficiary of the trust in 1965 because it did
not exist until 1973, and (3) the extrinsic evidence of the plat does not prove
that a trust actually existed.
Plaintiffs first argument is that Security Title Company owned the
property covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately 4,264.68 acres) outright
under the common law doctrine of description personae.
The common law doctrine of descriptio personae treats words that describe
the grantor or grantee in a deed as irrelevant. The doctrine was expressly applied
by this Court in TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 1031. In that
22

case, a grantor executed a deed using the word "trustee" after his name. But, he
had taken title in his own name without the word trustee. The grantor then
executed a second deed to a second grantee without using the word "trustee" after
his name. The second grantee argued that the first deed conveyed-nothing to the
first grantee because the grantor held the land in his own right and not as trustee.
In response, the first grantee invoked the doctrine of descriptio personae, arguing
that the word "trustee" in the first deed should be disregarded. This Court agreed
with the first grantee:
"The unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not,
absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust,
create a trust or implicate a trust interest. . . . [T]he deed should be
read and interpreted as if the word 'trustee' were not there." 2003 UT App
at para. 12, 66P.3dat 1034.
This Court said in dicta in TWN that extrinsic evidence may be introduced
to prove a trust actually existed. That is the law.2 The issue, then, is whether the
extrinsic evidence in this case proves, first, that a trust actually existed and, next,
that PMRI was its beneficiary.
Turning to the extrinsic evidence available in this case, the most important
evidence is the undisputed facts that (1) the Bates Deed was recorded in 1965, and
(2) PMRI was not incorporated until 1973. If there actually were a trust, PMRI
2

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 669, 669 (1982).
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could not have been the beneficiary because it did not exist in 1965. The 1965
Bates Deed must be construed based on 1965 evidence, not evidence of what
happened eight or nine years later.
If a trust existed in 1965, then must have had a beneficiary ("Beneficiary
X") and the trust res must have been the 4,264.68 acres covered by the Bates
Deed.3 There is no evidence whatsoever of any conveyance by Beneficiary X to
PMRI of its beneficial interest in the trust.
The trial court concluded that as a matter of law the extrinsic evidence of
the plat established that a trust existed and that PMRI was the beneficiary, but
neither the Owner's Dedication nor the Subdivider's Note describe PMRI as a
"beneficiary" or mention a trust. The Subdivider's Note only speaks of PMRI as
owning the streets, saying nothing about what interest, if any, it has in the rest of
3

In the companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners Ass'n,
Appellate No. 200430397 - CA, the trial court held that in 1971 the beneficiary of
the trust evidenced by the word "trustee" in the 1965 Bates Deed was another
corporation, Deseret Diversified Development. In this case, Peters, it held that
the beneficiary was PMRI. The only way to solve this inconsistency is to posit
that Beneficiary X convey its beneficial interest with respect to particular portions
of the trust res first to Deseret Diversified (with respect to the south half of Section
22) and then to PMRI (with respect to the 1,200 acres covered by the property
description in the 1973 CC&R's). Assuming a trust beneficiary has the power to
convey the trust's rights with respect to particular tracts of real property, those
conveyances are subject to the Utah Statute of Frauds and must be by written deed
subscribed by the grantor. And, at this point, those conveyances would be void for
non-recordation.
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the land covered by plat D, or the 1,200 acres covered by the 1973 CC&R's, or the
4,264.68 acres covered by the 1965 Bates Deed. If PMRI owned the streets and
nothing more, that would be a sufficient interest for it to sign the owner's
dedication. The people who sign the owner's dedication on a plat-are not
representing that they own the whole property covered by the plat, but only that
they have some interest in some part of that property. This is illustrated by the
plats for Plats "E," "F,"and "G" where other people sign with Security Title.
If PMRI was the beneficiary of a trust with Security Title as trustee holding
the land covered by the 1973 CC&R's, why was it allowed to be dissolved? It
was dissolved on December 31, 1979, and its beneficial interest would have gone
to someone. Why didn't that someone sign the subsequent Plats "E," "F," "G" and
"I"? In particular, why is Plat "I" signed by Security Title alone?
What would a reasonable person conclude from the evidence of plat D?
The only evidence is that PMRI signed the "owner's dedication" as an owner and
either it or Mr. W. Brent Jensen, dba Pine Meadows Ranch, is described in the
"Subdivider's Note" as owning and being responsible for maintaining the streets.
The first point is that an "owner's dedication" on a plat is like a quitclaim deed. In
effect, the signors "quitclaim" to the public the dedicated property interests. As in
the case of a quitclaim deed, the fact that people sign the owner's dedication does
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not necessarily mean that they actually own anything. People can sign the
dedication even if they own nothing. PMRFs signing is not evidence that it was
an actual owner of any part of the property, much less the beneficiary of a trust.
The "Subdivided s Note" says nothing about the existence of^a4rust. Nor
does it say anything about the ownership of the land other than the streets.
Moreover, the active role of PMRI (assuming PMRI and not W. Brent Jensen dba
Pine Meadows Ranch was intended), to maintain the streets, is inconsistent with
its being a trust beneficiary. It is the trustee who takes the active role in
maintaining the trust res. The beneficiary's role is essentially passive.
The active role taken by PMRI in maintaining the streets may be a clue to
what was actually going on. The most likely explanation for the "Subdivider's
Note" is that Summit County refused to be responsible for maintaining the streets,
so Security Title got PMRI (or Mr. W. Brent Jensen, dba Pine Meadow Ranch) to
agree to maintain the streets in order to get Summit County to approve the plat.
Their agreement was that the streets (most likely not in fee simple, but in the sense
of an easement)4 would belong to PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen. But, the

4

In Utah, roads are often "owned" by owning an easement of right-of-way
and not the fee; e.g., Utah Code Ann. see's 72 - 5 - 103 ("Acquisition of rights-ofway and other real property - Title to property acquired) and 7 2 - 5 - 1 0 4 ("Public
use constituting dedication - Scope) (2000).
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arrangement did not work out and Security Title never actually conveyed the
easement.
This explanation is consistent with the Owner's Dedication. If Security
Title owned the land (whether in its own right or as trustee for Beneficiary X) and
expected PMRI to own an easement covering the streets, the County would want
them both to sign the Owner's Dedication.
But, does PMRI own the streets in plat D? 5 There is no deed, recorded or
not, from Security Title to PMRI conveying the streets any other interest in (1) the
4,264. 68 acres covered by the 1965 Bates Deed, (2) the 1,200 acres covered by
the property description in the 1973 CC&R's, or (3) the portion of the 1,200 acres
covered by Plat "D." Therefore, although the Subdivider's Note put Petitioner on
inquiry notice to look for a deed, since no deed has been found, under the Utah
Recording Act whatever deed PMRI may have been given is now void for nonrecordation.6
From the perspective of the law, the important point is that for extrinsic
evidence to trump the doctrine of descriptio personae, it must prove that a trust

5

Actually, since PMRI was dissolved on December 31, 1979, whatever
property it owned has devolved to its shareholders, whoever they may be.
6

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 3 - 103 (2000)("Effect of failure to record").
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actually existed. Evidence that is merely consistent with a trust's existence is not
enough. A plausible explanation is no substitute for proof.
An example of a case where the extrinsic evidence proved a trust actually
existed is a 1981 Texas case, Neeley v. Intercity Management Corp^ ^23 S.W.2d
946 (Texas App. 1981).
In Neeley, Driscoll Production Corporation ("DPC") was in the business of
developing oil properties for investors. The investors paid in money and received
assignments of specific oil properties. But, some of the assignments were not
recorded. To correct this situation, DPC as grantor deeded to DPC "as trustee"
those oil properties that it was holding in trust for the investors. This deed was
duly recorded. Subsequently, DNC's creditors disputed the investors' rights in
these properties, arguing that the assignment from DPC to DPC as trustee was
ineffective under the doctrine of descriptio personam The extrinsic evidence of
the business dealings established - independently of the deed - that (1) DNC was
the trustee, (2) the investors were the beneficiaries and (3) the oil properties paid
for by the investors were the trust res. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
the extrinsic evidence proved that a valid trust had been created independently of
the deed. The deed from "DPC" to "DPC Trustee" reflected the existence of this
trust. It did not create the trust.
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In our case there is no extrinsic evidence analogous to the evidence in
Neeley to show that a trust actually existed in 1965 and that PMRI was assigned a
beneficial interest in such a trust in 1973 after it was incorporated. In our case, the
extrinsic evidence only shows that when Plat "D" was recorded in-4976, PMRI
may have had some ownership interest in the streets in Pine Meadow Ranch Plat
D. In our case, the only evidence there was a trust is the word "trustee" in the
1965 Bates Deed, and under the doctrine of descriptio personae that is not
enough.
2. Assuming it was a trust beneficiary, PMRI was not in "privity of
estate" for purposes of covenants running with the land because Security
Title owned the land in fee simple estate.
If the Court decides that as a matter of law a trust existed with Security Title
as trustee, PMRI as beneficiary, and the land covered by plat D as trust res,7 it
should go on to Plaintiffs second argument. Plaintiff argues that in order for
PMRI to impose covenants running with the land, under Utah law it had to own

7

Limiting the trust res to the property covered by Plat D would be
necessary to counter the embarrassing inconsistency between the rulings and
orders of the trial court in the two cases. In the companion case, the trial court
ruled that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's cover Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D. But,
the western portion of Forest Meadow Plat D extends into Section 21, and the
1973 CC&R's by their terms cover all of Section 21.
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an "estate" on August 22, 1973, when the 1973 CC&R's were recorded in order to
be in mutual or horizontal "privity of estate" with the person who originally
promised to be bound by the covenants; Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton
Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff argues that PMRI4*ad no estate
because Security Title Company owned the land in fee simple.
American real property law is based on a system of "estates."8 In essence,
an "estate" is a present possessory interest in real property.9 American real
property law recognizes only four basic estates - the fee simple, the fee tail, the
life estate, and the estate for a term of years.10 Utah does not recognize the fee tail,
so in Utah there are only three basic estates.
The historic reason for this limitation in the number of estates is the
medieval statute Quia Emptores enacted in England in 1290.11 This statute barred

8

RESTATEMENT OF THE L A W OF PROPERTY,

sec. 14 - 22 (1936).

9

Id. sec. 9. The restatement definition also includes certain future interests
that will or may become possessory in the future. These future interests are not
relevant in this case.
10

There are variations on these basic four which can be called distinct
estates. A fee simple can be absolute, determinable, on condition subsequent, or
subject to an executory limitation. A variation of a life estate is the estate pur
autre vie where the measuring life is not the tenant's life. The term of years can
be periodic, at will, or at sufferance. Still there are only four basic estates.
11

Act of 18Edw. I,c. 1(1290).
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subinfeudation (in effect, the creation of new estates) but made the fee simple
estate alienable. At first blush it seems ridiculous for modern courts to hold to
such an ancient rule of law, but holding to the ancient rule means that people
today know what their rights are. Today the fee simple estate, the life estate, and
the estate for a term of years are standard packages of rights that people have come
to understand.
An analogy is sometimes drawn between an estate and a bundle of sticks,
with each right of the estate's owner being one of the sticks in the bundle.
Applying the analogy to this case, the issue is who owned the stick entitled "right
to impose permanent covenants running with the land" when the 1973 CC&R's
were recorded? The answer depends on who owned the estate (present possessory
interest) in the land at that time because only the owner of the estate could be in
"privity of estate" with anyone.
The person who owned the estate in fee simple at that time was "Security
Title Company, Trustee" because by statute, the effect of the 1965 Bates Deed (as
a warranty deed) was to convey the whole 4,264.68 acres to it "in fee simple."
"A warranty deed . . . shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together
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with all appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto belonging . . . ,"12
Therefore, even on the assumption that PMRI had an equitable interest in the land
as the beneficiary of a trust, it had no "estate" and, therefore, could not be in
"privity of estate" with anyone and, therefore, could not bind the land with
covenants running with the land.
The consequence of this Court following this ancient rule of law in our case
will be that only the owner of the fee simple estate will be able to impose
permanent covenants running with the land.13 The stick entitled "right to impose
permanent covenants running with the land" will be part of the bundle of rights
called "the fee simple estate." This stick will not be part of the bundle of rights of
the beneficiary of a trust whose trustee owns land in trust in fee simple.
A strong policy reason for the requiring that the owner in fee simple estate
impose any permanent covenants is that it assures that the owner in fee simple
actually wants to impose the covenants. Allowing people with other ownership
interests to impose permanent covenants without obtaining the signature of the
owner in fee simple estate will inevitably raise the question of whether the

12

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000)("Form of warranty deed -

Effect").
13

The owners of a life estate or an estate for term of years will be able to
impose covenants for the duration of their estates, but not permanent covenants.
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covenants are binding - as illustrated by this case.
3. PMRI was (1) not in "mutual privity" because the covenants did not
arise from a transaction between it and a mutual owner of the same parcel of
land, (2) not in "horizontal privity" because it did not convey 4he land to a
person who agreed to be bound by the covenants, and (3) not in "vertical
privity" because it did not convey land to Plaintiff/Appellant's predecessor in
interest.
In Flying Diamond Oil, the Utah Supreme Court identified three types of
"privity of estate" in the sense of three relationships between the covenantor and
the covenantee that would meet the requirement of "privity of estate" - (1) mutual
privity (a covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the same piece of land),
(2) horizontal privity (a covenant created in connection with a conveyance of an
estate from one party to another), and (3) vertical privity (the devolution of an
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to
a successor).14 The Utah Supreme Court held that "mutual" privity and "vertical
privity" existed in Flying Diamond Oil where it held that a covenant to pay an oil
royalty ran with the land.
The Restatement position is that there must be either mutual or horizontal
14

Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 628.
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privity and vertical privity.

This position is consistent with the holding in Flying

Diamond Oil, but not necessarily compelled by it.
In the case of a declaration of CC&R's, "horizontal privity" typically arises
when the declarant deeds the lot to a grantee after the CC&R's are-recorded. This
sale is the "real estate transaction" between the declarant and the first grantee that
creates horizontal privity. "Vertical privity" then arises later, when the first
grantee sells to a successor in interest.
In this case, PMRI did not sell Lot 6 to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest.
Security Title sold the lot to Mountainland Properties. So PMRI was not in
"horizontal privity" with anyone.
There is no "mutual privity" in this case because PMRI did not enter into a
transaction with a person who had rights in the same piece of real property.16
"Mutual privity" is illustrated by the facts of Flying Diamond Oil where the owner
of the surface rights and the owner of the subsurface rights entered into an
agreement with respect to the shared parcel of land. "Mutual privity" never exists
with respect to a declaration of CC&R's because a declaration is a unilateral act.

15
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sec. 534 - 35 (1944).

16

"There is mutual privity if the parties have common rights in property."
Note, Covenants Running with the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-law Relic, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 145 (1978), cited in Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 623.
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The trial court found there was "mutual privity" in this case because it held
that Security Title was the trustee and PMRI was the beneficiary of the trust with
respect to Plat D. Even assuming the trial court was right about PMRI being a
trust beneficiary, there still would not be "mutual privity" because4he 1973
CC&R's were imposed unilaterally by PMRI and not by a recorded agreement
between it as beneficiary and Security Title as trustee.
There is no "vertical privity" in this case because PMRI is not Plaintiffs
predecessor in interest. Vertical privity arises after the original parties make their
agreement creating either mutual or horizontal privity. It arises only if the person
against whom the covenant is to be enforced is a successor in interest to the
original promisor. In this case, where the recording of the 1973 CC&R's was a
unilateral act, vertical privity would only exist if Plaintiff/Appellant were a
successor in interest to PMRI.17 But, Plaintiff is a successor in interest to Security
Title, not to PMRI. PMRI is a "stranger" to Plaintiffs chain of title.

17

In Flying Diamond Oil, vertical privity existed because Flying Diamond
(who sought to enforce the covenant) had purchased the surface rights from
Newton, the original promisee. 776 P.2d at 628.
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4. The holding of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds (that inferences drawn from recorded documents are no substitute for
a recorded deed), applies in this case because the Utah Statute of Frauds and
the Utah Recording Act make no distinction between title and trther interests
in real property.
In his first motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff relied on the decision
of this Court in Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds,1* for the rule that
the trial court could not create ownership in PMRI in 1973 from inferences drawn
from the recorded documents in the face of Security Title's record title. But, the
trial court held that Dunlap did not apply because Dunlap involved competing
claims of title, and this case does not. Plaintiff argues that this is not a valid
distinction because the difference in the facts is not legally relevant.
Whenever cases are distinguished "on their facts" the factual difference
must be legally relevant. Cases cannot be distinguished simply because the facts
are different. The facts are always different. For example, the parties, the
property, and the dates are always different. But these differences are not legally
relevant. Cases can only be distinguished if the difference in the facts is legally
relevant.
18

2003 UT App. 238, 76 P.3d 711.
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In Dunlap, the parties made competing claims to a mining claim competing claims of "title." In this case, the parties make competing claims as to
who owned property in 1973. Is the distinction between present ownership in
Dunlap and past ownership in this case relevant to the law?
It is not relevant. In Dunlap the Dunlaps claimed ownership based on
inferences drawn from recorded documents, chiefly a recorded mortgage deed that
recited that the purpose of the loan it secured was for the mortgagor, Park City
Development, to purchase the mining claim from its "then owner." But, there was
no recorded deed from the "then owner" of record, New Park - Nevada, to Park
City Development. Stichtings Mayflower traced its ownership back to New Park Nevada. In Dunlap the trial court drew the inference from language in the
mortgage deed (that the purpose of the loan was for the mortgagor to buy the
mining claim from its "then owner") that New Park - Nevada had previously
deeded the property to Park City Development, validating the Dunlaps' claim
which they traced back to the Park City Development. This Court reversed the
trial court, holding that a valid conveyance cannot be created by inferences of an
unrecorded deed (i.e., from New Park Nevada to Park City Development). Under
the Utah Recording Act, such an unrecorded deed is void. For the trial court to
create a deed out of inferences in the face of the statute was error.
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In our case, the trial court drew the inference from the ambiguous
statements on Plat D that Beneficiary X had deeded its beneficial interest in a
specific trust asset (the acres in the plat or, perhaps, the 1,200 acres purportedly
covered by the 1973 CC&R's) to PMRI after PMRI was incorporated and before
the 1973 CC&R's were recorded.19 But, if there was such a deed, it was an
unrecorded deed and is void as to Plaintiff. Neither the Utah Statute of Frauds nor
the Utah Recording Act make any distinction between real property held in trust
and real property not held in trust. The only distinction made by the statute is for
"leases for a term not exceeding one year." The Utah Statute of Frauds expressly
includes "any trust or power over or concerning real property." So, the factual
distinction between the facts of Dunlap and the facts of this case is not legally
relevant for purposes of the Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act.
So, the question that Defendant needs to answer in its brief is "why is it
legally relevant that Dunlap involved present title and this case involves past
ownership?"

The five week period from August 22 to September 28, 1973.
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5. Under the Utah general law of trusts, the beneficiary does not have
the power to encumber or otherwise dispose of the assets held by the trustee.
If this Court decides that the beneficiary does stand in privity of estate with
the transferees of the trustee, and that interests in real property can%e based on
inferences of an unrecorded deed, it should go on to Petitioner's fifth argument that under the Utah general law of trusts the trust beneficiary does not have the
power to encumber or otherwise dispose of property held by the trustee in trust,
and, therefore, the 1973 CC&R's are ineffective.
This is a question of the Utah general law of trusts because, assuming there
was a trust, the express terms of trust are not known.20 So, this Court should apply
Utah's default rules for the trust relationship, the rules that apply in the absence of
express provisions.21
It is true that in the language of trusts, the beneficiary is said to have

20

No trust document has been produced in this case.

21

Today in 2004, the relevant Utah law is the Utah Uniform Probate Code,
Utah Code Ann. see's. 7 5 - 7 - 4 0 1 et seq. ("Uniform Trustee's Powers
Provisions"). It provides that the trustee has the power to subdivide and develop
real property, Utah Code Ann. 75 - 7 - 402 (3) (j). This provision would, today,
give a trustee the power to impose CC&R's. The Uniform Probate Code gives no
such power, or any other power of disposition over the trust res, to the beneficiary.
This is consistent with the common law of trusts. But, the Uniform Probate Code
was enacted in 1975, well after the 1965 Bates Deed and the 1973 CC&R's.
Therefore, Plaintiff deals with this point as one of common law.
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"equitable title" to the property held by the trustee in trust while the trustee is said
to have "legal title." The phrase "equitable title" means that the beneficiary bears
the risk of loss if the property declines in value and chance of gain if the property
increases in value. It does not mean that the beneficiary has a powerto dispose of
the specific items of property held by the trustee. For example, suppose T holds
Blackacre in trust for the benefit of B. B has "equitable title" in the sense that B
has the risk of loss and chance of gain with respect to Blackacre. Under the
general law of trusts, B can sell his beneficial interest in the trust (in effect,
substituting the purchaser as a new beneficiary in his place), but B cannot sell
Blackacre itself.
If this Court reverses this ancient rule of law and holds that a beneficiary
has a power of disposition over the assets held in trust, it will have radical
consequences.
(1) The trustee will no longer be able to control the trust assets because
there will always be a risk that the beneficiary will exercise the power. What
happens if the beneficiary exercises the power without notice to the trustee and the
trustee then attempts to exercise the same power? Traditional spendthrift trust
provisions (which bar the beneficiary from disposing of his or her beneficial
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interest in the trust)22 will not prohibit the exercise of this new power because they
do not speak to power over the assets in the trust but only bar the beneficiary from
disposing of his beneficial interest in the trust. The new power of disposition will
cause these spendthrift trusts to fail.23
(2) Many trusts involve multiple beneficial interests, some simultaneous and
others in sequence of time. If A and B are simultaneous co-beneficiaries, does A
alone have any power over specific trust assets? If A is the income beneficiary for
life followed by B for life, followed by C for life, etc., does A have any power
over specific trust assets? If the trust provides for income to be accumulated by
the trustee, does the beneficiary have a power of disposition over the assets that
produces the income? These questions never had to be answered under the

22

76 A M J U R . 2 D Trusts sec. 121 ("General nature and purposes of
protective trusts; spendthrift trusts generally").
23

76 A M . J U R . 2 D Trusts sec. 130 ("Dominion and control of beneficiary"):

"The very basis of a spendthrift trust - the provision of maintenance and
support so someone in a way that protects the assets from the beneficiary's
improvidence - fails when the settlor has given the beneficiary the ability to
exercise dominion and control over the corpus form. Hence it is apparent that the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot be endowed with the entire dominion and
control of the trust property. Rather, the trust must be an active one in order not to
be executed into a legal estate or interest. Otherwise, where the beneficiary
exercises absolute dominion over the property of a spendthrift trust, such trust
fails." [citations omitted]."
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traditional general law of trusts because the beneficiary had no such power. If
this Court changes the rule, these and other questions will have to be answered.
(3) The effect of the bankruptcy of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust will
change. A spendthrift trust normally survives the bankruptcy of the^beneficiary
intact because the federal bankruptcy statute expressly gives effect to traditional
spendthrift provisions that bar the beneficiary from disposing of his beneficial
interest in the trust.24 But, if the beneficiary has a power of disposition over the
individual assets, the assets will go to the bankrupt beneficiary's estate under other
provisions of the federal bankruptcy law.25 The spendthrift trust will survive as a
hollow shell since all the assets will be sucked out thanks to the beneficiary's
power of disposition.

24

Section 541 (c) (2) of the Federal bankruptcy code excludes from the
debtor's estate the debtor's beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust by means of the
following language:
"A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (c) (2).
25

Under Section 541 (a) (1), all interests whatsoever of the debtor are
included in the bankrupt estate unless expressly excepted.
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case
[go into the debtor's estate]." 11 U.S.C. sec. 541 (a) (1).
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(4) Another consequence of the beneficiary having a power of disposition
over the assets within the trust is that the trust will cease to exist for federal
income tax purposes. The beneficiary's power of disposition will trigger the
"grantor trust" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which provide that when a
trust beneficiary has dominion and control over the trust assets, all items of
income and deduction must be reported by the beneficiary rather than the trustee.26
6. The 1973 CC&R's are unenforceable under the doctrine of
uniformity because they only cover Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, and not the
rest of the 1,200 acres that they purport to cover.
Pine Meadow Ranch currently consists of eight plats - A (104 lots), B (81
lots), C (49 lots), D (85 lots), E (100 lots), F (83 lots), G (101 lots) and I (43 lots).
The plats for A, B, and C are similar to the plat for D - PMRI signed the owner's
dedication and PMRI or Mr. W. Brent Jensen signed a similar "Subdivider's
Note." But, the plats for E, F, G, and I (a majority of the lots) were recorded in

26

Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Sections 671 - 679 (as amended). If the
grantor is the beneficiary and as such has a general power of disposition over the
trust assets, the applicable sections are 673 (reversionary interests), 674 (power to
control beneficial enjoyment), 675 (administrative powers), 676 (power to
revoke), and 677 (income for the benefit of the grantor). If the beneficiary is not
the grantor, the applicable section is 678 (person other than grantor treated as
substantial owner) which is triggered when a person "has a power exercisable
solely by himself to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in himself."
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1987 long after PMRI was dissolved at the end of 1979. On plats E, F, G, and I,
other people signed the owner's dedications with Security Title. Security Title
alone signed the owner's dedication on Plat I. If this Court agrees with the trial
court that an inference can be drawn from the signing of an owner-dedication as to
who is the beneficiary of a trust, and that a beneficiary has the power to bind real
property held in trust with permanent CC&R's, then the 1973 CC&R's are not
binding on Plats E, F, G and I because they were not signed by Security Title or by
those trust beneficaries. In any event, the 1973 CC&R's only bind 219 of 444 lots
- they do not bind most of the lots and the portion of the 1,200 acres they purport
to cover that is still unplatted.
Under the doctrine of uniformity, CC&R's that are irrationally and unfairly
non-uniform are not enforceable.27 So, if the Court rejects every other argument
Plaintiff has made, it should address this last argument - which Petitioner will
make in the form of a question: "how can the 1973 CC&R's be enforced fairly
when they only apply to a minority of the lots?
27

20 AM.JUR.2D Covenants, sec. 160 (1995) ("Requisites as to uniformity
of restrictions"):
"Restrictive covenants in deeds will not be enforced at the instance of other
property owners unless there is reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed,
so that each lot owner is afforded protection against acts of others equal to the
restriction on his or her own acts."
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7. The trial court was mistaken in concluding that "Plaintiff's
predecessors in interest" had agreed to the 1973 CC&R's, andheven if one of
them had so agreed, that agreement would be unenforceable under the Utah
Statute of Frauds and void under the Utah Recording Act.
In its Ruling and Order, the trial court makes the following statement:
""[E]ven if they [the 1973 CC&R's] are not restrictive covenants that run with the
land, they are restrictions that were contractually agreed upon [by] the Plaintiffs
predecessors in interest and the developer of the subdivision. Plaintiff had notice
of such contractually agreed upon restrictions and therefore, Plaintiff is bound by
that contract and the restrictions contained therein." R0419, "Ruling and Order"
at p. 4.
Plaintiff respectfully points out that CC&R's constitute interests in real
property subject to the Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act. Even
if there were parole evidence in the record that one or more of Plaintiffs
predecessors in interest had agreed to impose the 1973 CC&R's on lot 6 (and there
is not), the agreement would not be enforceable under the Utah Statute of Frauds
without a written document subscribed by the then owner. There is no such
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document in this case. Further, that document must be recorded or it is void
against Plaintiff under the Utah Recording Act.
The trial court appears to have believed that compliance with the Utah
Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act is only one way to create binding
CC&R's, that contract law provides an alternative route without the hassle of
written documents, signatures, notarial seals, and recordation. With all due
respect, the trial court is wrong on this point. The market for real estate cannot
function if there is an alternative way to create valid interests in real property that
leaves no record at the offices of Utah's County Recorders.
The statement by the trial court that the "developer of the subdivision"
agreed to the 1973 CC&R's appears to refer to PMRI. Even if PMRI were shown
to be the "developer of the subdivision" in the record ( and it has not been so
shown) status as "developer" would not permit PMRI to impose CC&R's on land
without compliance with the established rules of law. There is no alternative route
to impose CC&R's based merely on personal status.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully asks the Court to
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter summary judgment
for Plaintiff clearing his title to Lot 6 of the encumbrances of the 1973 CC&R's
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and the 1980 Notice of Lien because the 1973 CC&R's are invalid because they
were not signed by the owner of record of the property, Security Title Company.
If the Court rejects Plaintiffs first argument, Petitioner respectfully asks that the
Court remand the case with the same instructions based on one or more of
Plaintiffs other arguments - and for such other and further relief as is in
accordance with the law.
Dated: August D

, 2004
Respectfully submitted:

[/^ L i /
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPEfcLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing
Opening Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class
postage prepaid, addressed to the following person:
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216
Dated: August.
/s/ Bc^d)ECimball Dyer
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ADDENDUM

Addendum Document "1" - 1965 Bates Deed,

ae

M. Fee Paid $
Dep. Book-

In Oasi 1...H3... c f f l c r o f

Addrea_

Mifl tax oorice tou.

"aGfvxa-

. PIM.

?. I . SATES, also knovn as 7. Ephraita Bates, and
.MAE ?. BATES, also known as Mae Pritchett Bates, h i s wife
Coalville
County of
Sumait

CONVEY

188

• Reccrcicf. Simralr CounW,
untv, UiaH

WARRANTY DEED
of

P<t.^

grantor s
State of Utah, hereby

md WARRANT to
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE,
a Corporation of Utah
grantee

of

S a l t Lake C i t y

for the sura of

Covrsty

S a l t Lake

, State of Utah

- -DOi&xm

TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

the following described tract of land .In

County,

Sums It and Hon an

Sate of Utah, to-vin
The South half of Section 16; the East half of the Southeast
quarter of Section 17; the E.tst half of the East half of
Section 20; a l l of Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28; the East half
of the East half of Section 29; the North half and the North
half of the South half of Section 33; the North half and the
North half of the South half of Section 34; a l l In Tovnship
1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
(Containing ^proximately 4264.63 acres.)
TOCETEER WITS a l l vater and vater rights however evidenced
appurtenant to or used upon or l a connection with said property.
SUBJECT TO easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and rights of vay appearing
of record or enforceable in lav and equity, and taxes for the
year 1965 and thereafter.

WTTNESS the hand sofnJd {rancors, this

14 th

«^T of

A.aW65.

October

Signed in the presence of

Z-^.Os^Z-

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

SALT 1A10C

SSL
On the 14 th day of

\~ y •

October.

A. D. 13 65

perweafly

tppesred before me 7 . Z. BATES, a l s o knovn A* 7. Ephraba Bates,
and MAS P. BATES, also knovn as Ka« P r i t c h e t t &ates,
h i s vifa
therigncrsof»he within Imtrumcnr, who duly aefcoowtodgod
to me that t he ^executed the stm«. '

^CptanuxjJoQ Expircst
...Notary P u U k . ^ ^
12/21/67

",f^^>:v

#^$&J

Addendum Document "2" - First Page of Articles of Incorporation of Pine
Meadows Ranch, Inc.

Exhibit H
, _

CFPICE of

- --T^fty OF STATE
^r^rnG

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

W T , fl

.„

iifl

.

OF
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC.
We, the undersigned natural persons of the age of twentyone (21) years or more acting as incorporators of a corporation
under the Utah Business Corporation Act, adopt the following
Articles of Incorporation for such corporation,

ARTICLE I
Name
The name of the corporation is:
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC.

ARTICLE II
Duration
The period of duration is perpetual,

ARTICLE III
Purpose
The nature of the business, and the objects and purposes
proposed to be transacted, promoted and carried on, are to
do any or all of the things herein mentioned, as fully and
to the same extent as natural persons might or could do,
and in any part of the world, viz: Acquiring, developing, promoting
and selling real property and to engage in any other lawful
activity in which a corporation can be engaged in the State of
Utah.
The objects and purposes specified herein shall be regarded
as independent objects and purposes and shall not be limited
or restricted by reference to, or inference from, the terms
of any other clause of these Articles of Incorporation.

yCr

— J3Q1S1

VKQ3Q
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Addendum Document "3" - The 1973 CC&R's.

Entry No, . . 1 2 . 0 ^ 6 7
.>.': S-lSO
RECORDnD..% 1 *?.*^?e , ya:37>' "• ^ / . ^
REQUEST , ; ...^/- <?"•/?/ ^ * M > „
FEE
INOEXED

w,j;z».\ ' t »• ,,. j*>*TM»f o.^..^eco/«)£ji
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in:ia,rr _ _ _ / .

DECLARATION

OF' COVENANTS; CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

THIS DECLARATION, made on this

15

day of August, 1973,

by'rttaE MEADOW RANCH, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Declarant."

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Declarant i s the owner of or intends to acquire
certain property in Summit County, State of Utah, which i s more
particularly described a s :
The South one-half
quarter of Section
20; All of Section
Salt Lake Base and

of section 16; the East half of the Southeast
17; the East half of the East half of Section
2 1 ; a l l in Township 1 North, Range 4 East,
Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 a c r e s ) .

NOW THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that a l l of the
properties descrlDed above shall be held, sold and conveyed
subject to the following easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s , covenants,
and conditions, which are f o r the purpose of protecting the
value and d e s i r a b i l i t y of, and which shall run with', the real
property and be binding on a l l parties having any right,

title

or Interest i n the described properties or any part thereof,
their h e i r s , successors and a s s i g n s , and s h a l l inure '.o the
benefit of each owner thereof.

B00KM50 PAGE521
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ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
Section 1»

"Association" shall mean and refer to Pine

Meadow Ranch Home Owners' Association, its successors and assigns.
Section 2.

"Owner11 shall mean and refer to the recooi owner,

whether one or more persons or entities, of a fee simple title to
any Lot which is a part of the Properties, including contract
sellers, but excluding those having such interest merely an
security for the performance of an obligation.
Section 3.

"Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain

real property hereinbefore described, and such additions thereto as
may hereafter b e brought within the jurisdiction of the Association.
Section 4.

"Common Area" shall mean all real property owned by

the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the owners.

The

Common Area to be owned by the Association at the time of the conveyance
of the first lot is described as follows:

Section 5.

"Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land shown

upon any recorded subdivision map of the Properties with the exception
of the Common Area.

B00KM50
-2-
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Section 6.

"Declarant" aha 11 mean and refer to P^.ne Meadow

Ranch, Inc., its successor* and assigns If auch aucceasora or assigns
should acquire

more Chan one undeveloped Lot from the Declarant for

the purpose of development.

ARTICLE II
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Section 1,

1

Owner.*. Easements of Enjoyment.

Every owner shall

have a right and easement of enjoyment In and to the Common Area
which shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to every
Lot, subject to the following provisions:
(a)

The right of the Association to charge reasonable

adraiaalon and other fees for the use of any recreational
facility situated upon the Common Area;
(b)

The right of the Association to suspend the voting

rights and right to use of the recreational facilities by
an owner for cny period during which any assessment against
his Lot remains unpaid; and for a period not to exceed 60 days
for any infraction of its published rules and regulations;
(c)

The right of the Association to indicate or transfer

all or any part of the Common Area to any public agency,
authority, or utility for such purposes and 3ubject to such
conditions as may be agreed to by the members.

No auch

dedication or transfer shall be effective unless an instrument
signed by two-thirds C2/3) of each member agreeing to auch
dedication or transfer has been recorded.

-3-
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Section 2.

Delegation of Uae.

Any owner may delegate, in

accordance with the By-Laws, his right of enjoyment to the Coxamon
Area and facilities to .the members of his family, his tenants, or
contract purchasers,

ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS
Section 1.

Every owner of a lot which is subject to assessment

shall be a member of the Association.

Membership shall be appurtenant

to and may not be separated from ownership of any Lot which is subject
to assessment.
Section 2.
membership:

The Association shall have only one class of voting

A member shall be all Owners and shall be entitled to

on* vote for each Lot owned.

When more than one person holds an

interest in any Lot, all such persons shall be members.

The vote

for such Lot shall be exercised as they among themselves determine,
but in no event shall more than one vofa be cast with respect to any Lot.

ARTICLE IV
COVENANTS FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 1,

Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation

of Assessments.

The Declarant, for each Lot owned within the

Properties, hereby covenants, and each Ovn«r of any Lot by
acceptance of a deed therefor, whether of not it shall be so
expressed in such deed, is deemed to covenant-and agree to pay to
the Association:

(1)

annual assessments or charges, and (2)

special assessments for capital improvements, such assessments to

B00KM5O PA6E5.^
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be esfcaolished'attd collected 4s hereinafter provided.

The annual

and special'assessments, together with Interest, costs, and
reasonable attorney1s feen, shall be a charge on the land and
shall be a continuing lion upon the property against which each
iuch assessment is made.

Each such assessment, together with

interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also be
the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
property at the time when the assessment fell due.

The personal

obligation for dellzjquent assessments shall not pass to his
successors in title unless expressly assumed by them.
Section 2.

Purpose of Assessments.

The assessments levied

by the Association shall be used exclusively to promote the
recreation, health, safety, and welfare of the residents in the
Properties and for the improvement, and. maintenance of the recorded
roads, Common Area, and of the homes situated upon the Properties,
Section 3.

It is agreed that the Association has the right,

in the event any member allows his lot or lots to become an eye-so re,
unattractive, or a nuisance by taeans of neglect or carelessness, to
cause the lot to be corrected.

The coat of such correction to be

paid by the members and to become a li-m on the lot being so corrected.
However, before the Asaociatlon can take such action the member must
be given 30-days written notice by registered mail.
Section 4.

Special Assessments for Capital improvements.

In

addition to the annual assessments authorised above, the Association

B0QKM50 PAGE525
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may levy t - I n any assessment y>aar, a special assessment applicable
to that, year only for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part,
the Jcoat of any* construction, reconstruction, repair or replacement
of a capital improvement upon the Common Area, including fixtures
and personal property related thereto, provided that any such
assessment i h a l l have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes
of each member whom are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting
duly called for this purpose.
Section 5.
Section 3.

Notice and Quorum for Any Action Authorized Under

Written notice ot any meeting called for the purpose

of talcing any action authorized under Section 3 s h a l l be 3ent to a l l
members not l e s s than 30 days nor more than 60 days in advance of the
meeting.

At the f i r s t such meeting c a l l e d , the presence of members

or of proxies e n t i t l e d to cast sixty percent (60Z) of a l l the votes
of each c l a s s of membership shall c o n s t i t u t e a quorum.

If the

required quorum i s not present, another meeting may be called
subject to the aame notice requirement, and the required quorum at
the subsequent meeting shall b*» one-half C1/2) of the required
quorum at the preceding meeting.

No such subsequent meeting shall

be held more than 60 days following the preceding meeting.
Section 6,

Uniform Rate of Assessment.

Bouh annual and

special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for services
provided for a l l Lots, and may be collected on a monthly, quarterly
or annual basis«
Section 7.

Date of Commencement of Annual Assessments:

Due Dates.

The annual aaaeaamenta provided for herein s h a l l commence as to a l l

B00KM5O
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Lots on the first day of the month following the conveyance of the
Common Area*

The first annual assessment shall be adjusted according

to the number of months remaining in «/ve calendar year.

The Board

of Directors stall fix the amount of the annual assessment against
each Lot at least thirty (30) daya in advance of each annual
assessment period.

Written notice of the annual assessment shall

be aent to evei/ Owner subject thereto.
established by the Board of Directors.

The due dates shall ^e
The Association s h a H , upon

demand, and for a reasonable charge, furnish a certificate signed
by an officer of the association setting forth whether the assessments on a specified Lot have been paid.
Section 8,
tha Association.

Effect of Nonpayment of Assessments:

Remedies of

Any assessment not paid within thirty (30) days

after the due date shall bear interest from the due date at the rate
of cwelve percent (12X) per annum.

The Association may bring an

action at law against the Owner personally obligated to pay the
same, or foreclose the lien against the property

No owner may

waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provided
for herein by non-uae of the Common Area or abondonment of his Lot.
Section 9.

Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages.

The lien

of the assessments provided for herein shall be subordinate to the
lien ot any first mortgage.

Sale or transfer of any Lot shall not

affect the assessment lien.

However, the sale or transtar of any

lot pursuant to mortgage foreclosure or any proceeding in lieu
thereof, shall extinguish the lien of such assessments as to

-7
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payments whi^h became due p r i o r t o such s a l e o r t r a n s f e r .
or t r a n s f e r , s h a l l

No s a l e

r e l i e v e such Lot from l i a b i l i t y f o r any a s s e s s m e n t s

t h e r e a f t e r becoming due o r from th/j l i e n
S e c t i o n 1 0 . Rubbish removal.

thereof.

I t i s agreeded t h a t the a s s o c i a t i o n w i l l

c o n t r a c t a n n u a l l y t o remove t h e p e r s o n a l rubbish from a common p i c k - u p a r e a .
ARTICLE V
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL
No b u i l d i n g , f e n c e , w a l l o r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s h a l l be commenced,

erected

o r m a i n t a i n e d upon t h e P r o p e r t i e s , n o r s h a l l any e x t e r i o r a d d i t i o n t o o r
change o r a l t e r a t i o n t h e r e i n be made u n t i l t h e p l a n s and

specifications

showing t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e , k i n d , s h a p e , h e i g h t , m a t e r i a l s , and l o c a t i o n of
t h e same s h a l l have been s u b m i t t e d t o and approver' i n w r i t i n g a s «-o harmony
of e x t e r n a l d e s i g n and l o c a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o surrounding s t r u c t u r e s and
topography by t h e Board of D i r e c t o r s of the A s s o c i a t i o n , o r by an a r c h i t e c t u r a l
committee composed of t h r e e ( 3 ) o r more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a p p o i n t e d by the Board.
I n the e v e n t s a i d Board, o r i t s d e s i g n a t e d c o m m i t t e e , f a i l s

t o approve o r

d i s a p p r o v e such d e s i g n and l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) days a f t e r s a i d

plans

and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s have been s u b m i t t e d t o i t , a p p r o v a l w i l l not be required and
t h i s A r t i c l e w i l l be deemed t o h a v e been f u l l y complied w i t h .
ARTICLE VI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section I.

Enforcement.

The A s s o c i a t i o n , o r any Owner,

shall

have the r i g h t t o e n f o r c e , by any p r o c e e d i n g law o r i n e q u i t y ,
a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s , conditions, covenants,

reservations,

l i e n s and

-8-
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charges now or hereaf Cer imposed by Che provisions of Chis Declaracion.
Failure by Che AsaociaCion or by any Owner Co enforce any covenants
or resCricCion herein contained shall in no evenc be deemed a
waiver of the righc Co do so chereafCer.
Section 2.

Severability.

InvalidaCion of any one of chese

covenanCs or resCricCions by judgment or uourc order sha.ll in no
wise affecC any ocher provisions which sh411 remain in full force
and effect.
SecCion 3.

AmendmenC.

The covenanCs and resCrlccions of

This Declaracion shall run wich and bind Che land, for a Certu of
cwenCy (20) years from Che daCe this Declaracion is recorded,
afCer which cinve Chey cha.ll be auComacically exCended for
successive periods of Cen (10) years.

This Declaracion may be

amended during Che firsC CwenCy (20) year period by an inscrument
signed by not less Chan nineCy peccenC (90Z) of Che LoC Owners,
aixl chereaf Cer by an instrument signed by noc less Chan sevenCy-five
peccenC (757.) of Che LoC Owners.
SecCion 4.

Annexation.

Any amendment mus C be recorded.

Additional property and Common

Area may be annexed co Che Properties wiCh Che consent of twothirds (2/3) of Che ouCsCanding voces.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, che undersigned, being Che Declarant herein,
has hereunco set ics hand and *eal chis

15

day of

Augusc

19 73

PTNF MEADOW- RANCH
DeclaranC
^
By.

Its

f>,^f,^//^

800KW5O PAGF

STATE OF UTAH

On the 28th day of September 1973, personally appeared before
mc W. Brent Jensen, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
President of Pine Meadow Ranch and chac said instrunment was signed
in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws, and said
W. Brent Jensen acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the
same.

;• •

'7

&k

Reed D. Pace, Notary Public
Residing in Summit County

«* /
^r;
M

nl

<

:

. \ - < t vx c \'S;
* > ; •

x

My-Commission Expires:

Feb ruary lg, 1975
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Addendum Document "4" -1976 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D."

SURVEYORS

STATE OF UTAH,.
COUNTY OF
.Wr
On lhe__2!e
day
a p p e a r e d before
who
the

being
said
the

ond

duly

fiafSPorJ

W•

W

T\K.Y-

sworn
Diit^

ond

did

Cem>n«*^

instrument

authority

<nji*^a<k4^

of

was

..

ond

signed In

a r e s o l u t i o n of

U.DicV.

personolly
» ^ y «

say ,

{W-IV%TTC

each (or himself , thai he

_ i s Ihe t i K M h j - P r e s i d e n t , ond

said l W ^ J t L _ S A * l k 6 T i s | » the

foregoing
Ihs

AD I 9 0 ±

IIDM

by me

of_^E«-"-^HYl(Vte

by

SUBDIV1DERS

LJULC
of_HaJL

and

A>»^. S » < . t t W H

appeared

i
day of Attd
before me til. KttHT

who

being

by me

th»

voidttl- B « t N T

.AD

rr»«t«

duly sworn d i d
rCHitrJ

19 2 3 ! p e r o n o l t y
on<j

i 5 the

The recording

Ml!£j2kauxCj>?**S*«

soy.eoch for himself
President

(hot he
ond

of

roads

It

is

the

property

Shall

be

of

and

Mended

NOTE

this

plot

streets
that
of

shall not

or rights of

oil streets

constitute

way to

shown

o

dedicatio

public.

he/von shall remain

the subdivider , Pine Meadow R a n c h ,

completely

maintained

by

and

said owner.

Ihol Ihe wllhin ond
behalf

of said

its b o a r d
UrS»ey

of
ti

corporation

directors

BOWir.AHY uEscKirrro::

RARTHTTE
COCKSt

;frj5«^d&^|»dged

to me thot

said

CERTIFICATE

I, . Ralph. U .Nflr.lhrup
. _.
do hereby certily that 1 am a F..= .i
islered Civil Engineer, and or Lend Surveyor, and that I hoi
ceriiiiccrte No. . _2J47
. a s prescribed under the laws o! trv
Stale of Utah. I further certify thai by auihority ol ihe Ov/nets, I hav
made a survey of the frac; of land shov/n on this plat and describe;
belcw, end have subdivided said Irac! ol lar.d into lots and streets, h*:r
oiler to be known as._ ._. Pine Meadow Ranch , Rlo|.".D" .
.......
end that same lias beer, correctly surveyed ana siaked on the grourn
as shown on tin's plat.

corporal ion

D!ST.

SE».?Ant:3

Beginning, at the SE comer of Section 16 . T. 1 N , R
5.L. B. S M . : Ihence

]

1

NORTH
1310.74'
WEST
3640.15 1
N.e-30'W. 271.33"
N.87*35'44"W. 556.79'
S.39*30'W. _J35_.O.C
415.23*
M84'I5'W.
S.5945'W. 481.59'
S0*H'03"E. _285.Q2r
N.76*54'll"E. 91. 52'
S.79p5e'09't. 197.25'
HG7°x}&i. l.'?..7fc£
T
se^ia'ae^. I73.39
£72*28'S^E. 226.01'
r
186.69'
N.83*W 23"E
S 65*11" 29"E. 346.39'
S8012'52!rEj 172.34'
N.78*47,40nE. 223.91'
&T7'4Cf3^E 336.45'
S.6l«2lr02" E. _3_60.32j
S.89a59,57"E. 154,21
^300.4tf
SOUTH
EAST
1754.14

to Jhe point of beginning , containing 100 0 0 acrafr,_

DATE

Know all men by these present? Uta'._._. , th^s
undersigned owne; '.
ol the above described tract ol land, having caused seme JC bs s; i*
divided into lots and streets lo be hereafter known as the

PINE MEADOW RANCH . PLAT
do hereby dedicate fcr perpetual use ol the public ai] parcels ol Jan
shown on this plat as intended far Pubiic usvi.
In witness v/hereo!
have hereunto set
th
_..
day of
A.D., 19

PINE MEADOW
Wesley B r e f t t Jensen
President
SECURITY

_

M

EXEC We P r e s i d e n t

RANCH

Ze'fla j / Jenseh
Secretary
T I T L E CO.,TRUSTEE
Assf. S e c r e t a r y

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

CONTOUR INTERVAL!
2 5 FT.

STATE OF UTAH 1 „ County of Sail Lake J ^
_A.D., 19
personally appealed be!
On the._ _day of_
me, the undersigned Notat7 Public, in and for said County
in said State ol Utah, the signer? ) of the above Owner's dedicati
in number, v/ho duly acknowledged to me thai
signed it freely and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes the;
mentioned.
i.fY COMMISSION' r/MRt3:

PLAT'D'" \'-- LOCATED »\ " Hr.
SECTION IS , T !
U./ri.4±.

S 1/2 Ol-

i.AKf. BASK 4 t/W.tvAl!

. .£.. DArcf5^r..

I

A D . i*jL{p—... AT v.'tit.>: Ttwt infs syiotvistot: WA.'. AITROVITJ
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ami.

aiAim.rAu, B:». c-rcc.

coui

Rr-copprr. J>
•:-t*:nv or-S^
yC'?. May. ** (3 7.6.. rr.•.!.

i,3i

rfrr

CONTOUR

INTERVAL

25'

N O T E : ALL ROADS HAVE 6 6 F T . R/W

PINE MEADOW R A N O
PLATED"
SUMMIT COUNTY
SHEET 2 0 F 2
SCALE 1"=100
X31S&S.

Addendum Document "5" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "E."
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Addendum Document "6" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "F."
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OCCUPANCY RESTRICTION
SUMMIT COUNTY HAS AN ORDINANCE Wl
RESTRICTS THE OCCUPANCY OF BUILDINGS
Ml THIN THIS DEVELOPMENT.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS UHLAWFUL TO OCCUPY
A BUILDING LOCATED WITHIN THIS
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FIRST HAVING
OBTAINED A CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY
ISSUEO 8Y THE BUILDING INSPECTOR.
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PINE MEADOW RANCH HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
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Addendum Document "7" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "G."
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WITHIN THIS DEVELOPMENT.
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A BUILDING LOCATEO WITHIN THIS
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ISSUEO BY THE BUILDING INSPECT
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Addendum Document "8" -1987 Plat of Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "I."

Addendum Document "9" - 1977 Deed from Security Title to Mountainland Properties.

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
(CORPORATE FORM)

SECURITY TITl.K COMPANY, Trustee, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of U t a h , with its principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVKYS A N D W A R R A N T S against all claiming by, through
or under it to
MOUNTA INLAND PROPERTIES, INC.
of

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

grantee

Utah

for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable considerations
the following described tract of land in
Summit
State of Utah:

County,

L o t s 6, 9 5 , and 9 6 , PINE HEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D"
•Lot 19, PINE KEADOW RANCH, PLAT "CM
Lot 2 4 , PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT " B "
Also:
from
East,
feet;
511.1

BECINNINC a t a p o i n t 137.1.84 f e e t North and 8 5 2 . 3 2 f e e t West
t h e S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 1 6 , Township 1 N o r t h , Range A
S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and r u n n i n g t h e n c e West 8 5 2 . 3 2
thence North 511.1 f e e t ; thence East 852.32 f e e t ; thence South
f e e t t o t h e p o i n t of BECINNINC.

SUBJECT TO e a s e m e n t s , r e s t r i c t i o n s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , c o v e n a n t s and r i g h t s
of way a p p e a r i n g of r e c o r d and Cenera-1- p r o p e r t y t o ' c e o .

1

<ft~

fc»ryNa

U a U S . i . 5«i ..r?X.?.Z...

\ "*•;'- f ^Uc^^iJ^
J -^ y

...-iX-Jr?;. .

V.'ANu* * J , » < . ? . W 1 J i ; v « ' J H . ' . ; i , ; . ; . . . .

: 3 * "•

s^-^.7/X-^

j wja-.ta

AS?r.v»..sr

/_../

<s ' \

••- "••The*officers"wKo""s1gn this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate n a m e and seal to be hereunto
affixed by its duly authorized officers this
12th day of
July
, A.D., 10 77

Attest-/ /.•;•

~> )
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee

. . . ^
Secretary.

L. R. WIGHT

•" * '• * /
(C:OK>OR/\TE SF..U.)
;

President.

S.TATEOFUTAl;L

:

.
*r - .
: '"'
* .Cott n'ty; o7 Sa 11 Lake
' ' • • O n . . t h e " * 12ch
day of
July
,A.O. 1977
'personally appeared before mc
LEO D. JENSEN
and
L. R. WRIGHT
who bein£ by mc duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
LEO D. JENSEN
is , n c
is the Vice President, and she, the said
L. K. WRIGHT
Secretary
of SKCUK1TY T I T L E C O M P A N Y , Trustee, and that the within and foregoing instrument
was.,.signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Hoard of Directors
and.;',riul.
LEO D. JENSEN
and
L. R. WRIGHT
each dul)- acknowledged to mc that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
;.s l!n\ .-.cal of said corporation.
y*
^

.J;Ut£.T.r>^...L<^
Notary Public.
c>:pi res

,Wi-.7H..

..My residence is Salt Lake City, Utal

Addendum Document "10" - Certificate of Dissolution of PMRI on December 31,1979.

0 7-0 1-148 <WE

Cy VUXAS aL c^ot. o a^vnoAy/

./77)

c) ccoeta/LU/ ai/ c) taU/

CERTIFICATE OF INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
OF

PINE^NEAUOW RANCH, INC.
#060608
/, DAVID

S. MONSON,

Lt. Governor/Secretary

Utah, and by virtue of the authority

of State of the State of

vested in me by law, according to the

provisions of Section 16-10-88.5 of the Utah Business Corporation Act, hereby
issue this Certificate of Invohmtary

G60608
PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC.
DOUG SMITH
613 1 ST AVE.
SLC, LTAH
84103

S/T

Dissolution.

060608
PlUE MEADOW RANCH,
W. BRENT JENSEN
P . O . BOX 274
WOODS CROSS UTAH
84C67

INC.
PRES

FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORT

IN

TESTIMONY

WHEREOF,

I have

hereunto set my hand and affixed the
Great Seal of the State of Utah at Salt
Lake City, this
31st
clay of
December
A.D. 19, 79

^JS?k

LT. G O V E R N O R / S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E

y ft
A U T H O R I Z E D F^ERSON

Addendum Document "11" -1980 Deed from Mountainland Properties to Ryan.

Recorded at Request of
at

, M. Fee Paid $„
.Dep. Book-

by-

.Ref.:

. Page

.Address^

Mail tax notice to_

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
[CORPORATE FORM]

MOUNTAINLANO PROPERTIES, I N C .
, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with Its principal office at
S a l t Lake C i t y
, of County of
S | l t Lake
, State of Utah,"
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to

J o h n F . Ryan,

a m a r r i e d man

grantee
for the sum of
__ DOLLARS
County,

of

S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
Ten d o l l a r s a n d n o / 1 0 0 - the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:

Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D", Lot 6 according to the plat thereof as
recorded in the office of the Summit County recorder's office.
SUBJECT TO easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way and
reservations appearing of record and taxes for the year 1980 and
therafter.
j
—
f-frn—Hf>
Enfry No
i i i y ^ . ™ ' BooV Z232jt>
3

R£ccJ!»)rr)...a.-r.:«i ^JCMIM r ^ z s a J
RE?' '-"r,«v^Aak.^.'.Uu
JT

T

<*

WANOA Y. s^;GCi. SUMMIT cp. KCORO
ROCK

•NOlXf 0

AWTRACT

/

'

* ' "

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to 1* hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
4 t h day of
August
, A . D . 19 80
MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, INC.
By

J^,,ASrtti^&^j(?
.Cwrb^sgiK.'S

'

President.

S'TATE^Otf J3TAIL j
LO

County, of 'J ..*V » /
On^hc.
"4th
day of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 0
.A. D.
personally appeared before me B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d
Marlys J. Rangen
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said S . B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d
is the
V i c e president, andAc, the said
M a r l y s J . Rangen
is the secretary
of
Mountainland P r o p e r t i e s , I n c .
, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority, of a resolution of its board of
directors and said S . B r e n t S u t h e r l a n d
M a r l v s J . .Rangen
Rn d
•each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed tho.-^n^e.and.Vhat the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.* '* l *'
••'-'-

C ftv.;$oSjf WJLLM
My commission expires-

-m

-My residence ls_

^(uj<

<3

CP

o

Addendum Document "12" - 1984 Deed from Ryan to Mountainland Properties,

Recorded a: Request of
at

MO^.TACN PROPERTIES
1 J Ashton Avenue
_SiijLcJ^ke-OJL>u..lJ£aiL.JaAlQ£-

. M, Fee P*id $
I>.p. Booh

Mail tsuc notice to „—..

of

. Ref.r.

Page...
Address-...

WARRANTY DEED
RYAN
JOHN/AND WALLEEN RYAN , a l s o knovu as JOHN F. RYAN and
grantor
WALL E EN' W. RYAN
SALT
LAKE
SALT LAKE. CITY
County cf
State of Utah, hereby

CONVEY

and WARRANT to
HOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, I N C .
grantee

0f

SALT LAKE CITY

County

SALT LAKE

, Static of Utah

forthciumof TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD CONSIDERATION-

DOLLARS

SUMMIT

the followini described tract of Uod la

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:

PINE MEADOW RANCH PLAT D, LOT 6 a c c o r d i n g t o che o f f i c i a l
r e c o r d e d i n Che o f f i c e o f che r e c o r d e r o f s a i d c o u n c y .

Envy No.
REQUEST Of
FE5

plac as

£26099 .
secuPjTYTragco.
.,

*±">./f a

-

By

%A^^^J-

RECORDED ^Lr-^r.-.<g£-. r-x J 4 - f #

,u* 3l8r,:r770
WITNESS :he hand of aid grxneor

t

tfaii

c>^4

H.

Signed la the presence of

day of
X.„..^X-^^.-.A~.V-\
JOHfl

_

-M ^*—-^

.^^C^^^fJr^ri...
WALLEEN W. RYAN

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF " S * J ^ t £LQ-{

{ ss.
On the 25+ day of O

•f*::--#'
rfb^^SSM^J7^

personally

appeared before me JOHN RYA^V'^^^X^rraTAN^alJo known as
JOHN F. RYAN and WALLEEN&WiAtt"'*»*"/,,,
':. s£ ;
the «gncrs of the within imrxuror^K^bo.duly iKkndjrltfecd - £j
to me that thsy executedrf^esjtn^/^P-' J v .. *N \ V- ^
My Commission Expires;,
Notary Public % '^fp'o-

° .-*\^ ^ \ <

T>t»» o t i o r«iwr*o c«r<ciALX.y ron PHOTO-ncca not MO. u»* BLACK I N * AMO rrr*.

Addendum Document "13" - 1985 Deed from Mountainland Properties to Blanchard.

I

I

RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD
398 East Vine S t r e e t
Recorded at Request nf Murray. l?rah
84107
_ M. Fee Paid $_

at_

_Dep. Book__

byMail Ux notice >*

RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD

.Ref.

, Pa?R.

AHHfM 398 East Vine S t . , Hurray, Utah 84107

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
(CORPORATE FORM]

MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES, INC.
, a corporate ;n
organized and existing; under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
SALT LAKE C I T r
SALT LA£E
§ of C o u n t y o(
f s u t e of UUh,
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS ag-ainat alt claiming by, throusrh or under It to
RAYMOND R. BLANCHARD
dba BLANCHARD ENGINEERING
of
SALT LAKE CITY
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD & VALUABLE CONSIDERATION-the following described tract of land in
SUMMIT
State of UUh:

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS
County,

PINE MEADOW RANCH PLAT D, L o t 6 a c c o r d i n g Co t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t
as r e c o r d e d i n t h e o f f i c e of t h e r e c o r d e r of Summit County.

\

Emry NO.- 2 3 2 2 G 4 -

r.

ALAN SWIOGS. SUM-ViT CC R ^ O . ^ 1 ^

\

The officera who aigm this deed hereby certify that thia detd and the tranafer represented
thereby waa duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted b^-^he board of directora of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorumr*
*
In witneaa whereof, the grantor Jtaa ^auaed ita corporate name and aeal to be hereunto affixed
r
by ita duly authorized officera thia
^icfi
A. D. 18 84
day of O c t o b e r
Attest:

^

MOUNTAINLAND PROPERTIES,

(y

SecraUry.

INC.

\Au
Prcaident.

[CORPORATE SEAL]

ooor

STATE OF UTAH,

336PW464.

County of
2 5 c h
October
On the
day of
personally appeared before me T . M c N e i l
and
who being- by me duly aworn did aay, each for himself, that he, the
x<
» the
president, and he, the said T y l e r M c N e i l
!i [ ? ^ ' i tyi aecr^ar/i £
of M o u n t a i n l a n d P r o p e r t i e s , I n c .
, and that'^Vwftnjrtadi^r^oM^:.^
instrument waa signed in behalf of aaid corporation by authority of absolution ot ita" 6&ff <tf.&: /
directora and said
T y l e r McNeil
and
C. M i c ^ a e l - . N i ' e l s e n . . . it .;.-* , V.^/
each duly acknowledged to me that aaid corporation executed the aama'i^nd that'the M a j ' ^ f l ^ e ^ '
ia the aeal of aaid corporation.

S
11-16-86

My comraiaaion expirna.
O

4 < M PT\.

_My reaid ence la
CO. •

t a n to. ]•<><, t»»T

• »*CT L»4« €11

'.- ',?& v^JhfqCiry;; Public.
SAlt'*Tiake^^;' V ^
-., ; •• • *••''>>•

Addendum Document "14" - 1999 Deed from Blanchard to Plaintiff Peters.

_Paul H. P e t e r s

Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use
Order N o . :

15741 I

WARRANTY DEED
Raymond R. Blanchard
of S a l t Lake C i t y

State of Utah

grantor
hereby

CONVEY S and WARRANT S to Paul H. P e t e r s

grantee
of

Park C i t y

County

Summit

State of f t a h

for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in
County, State of Utah

Summit

to-wic

ALL OF LOT 6, PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D", ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT
THEREOF, ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER.

Subject to easements, covenants restrictions, rights of way and reservations
appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1999 , and each year thereafter.

00523 112

BK01222 PGQG335-Q0335

ALAN SPRIGGS* SUHHIT CO RECORDER
1??? JAN 20 K:5? P« FEE ilO.OQ BY DHG
REQUESTS FIRST AHERICAN TITLE CO UTAH

ti
U
CL

m
WITNESS the hand of said grantor

, this 19 th

day of

January

Signed in the presence of

STATE OF

Utah
<SS.

COUNTY OF Summit
On the 19 t h
Blanchard

day of

January

AX). 1999

personally appeared before me Raymond R.

the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged tame that—he

IT s<tt^
^—^
_

Notaf Pub,ic
y
*
BECKY K. PHILLIPS ,
t745SidowtclBf Or«v«
Par* City. Utah 84Q60
My r.omniisr.icr» Empires
November 22.2001

1
.
|

executed the same.

'. Phillips
M y Coi

Expires:

November 22, 2001

Addendum Document "15" - The Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22,2004, in
The Companion Case, Forest Meadows, etc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FOREST MEADOW RANCH PROPERTY
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, LLC,
Petitioner,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 000 60.0092

vs.

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK

PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME
ASSOCIATION et.al.,

DATE: March 22, 2004

Respondents.
The above matter came before the court on March 15, 2004,
for oral argument on Petitioner's and Respondents' cross motions
for summary judgment and petitioner's motion to strike.
Plaintiff was present through Boyd Kimball Dyer, and Defendant
was present through Edwin C. Barnes.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner originally-sought summary relief to nullify
wrongful liens. The liens arise as a result of Petitioner's
alleged failure to pay association fees to Respondent and
Respondent's filing of a lien against Petitioner's property based
on such failure to pay fees.
Petitioner is a record interest holder in lot 105A Forest
Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Lot 105A-D), which was originally part of
Lot 105 that has been subdivided into approximately 500 lots.
In 1965, Security Title Company (Security) as "Trustee" not
named on the warranty deed received by that warranty deed several
square miles of real property from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates.
That land was later subdivided and became the Forest Meadow
subdivision and Pine Meadow subdivision. Security Title was
listed on the deed as "Trustee" and no beneficiary was named.
On March 10, 1971, Deseret created its Articles of
Incorporation, signed by W. Brent Jensen (Jensen), and those were
filed with the Secretary of State on March 18, 1971. On July 8,
1971, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
(CCRs) was signed by Jensen. On July 22, 1971, Jensen filed and
recorded, on behalf of Deseret Diversified Development for Forest
Meadow Ranch the CC&R' s for southern part of the subdivision
(Forest Meadow CC&R's). The CCRs provided that Deseret was the

00368

owner of the land and the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners
Association and assigns would administer and enforce the CCRs.
The Forest Meadow CCRs further stated:
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon
all persons owning or occupying any lot, parcel or
portion of the real property enumerated at the
beginning hereof until January 1, 1990, and for
successive twenty (20) year periods unless within six
(6) months of the end of the initial period or any
twenty (20) year period thereafter a written agreement
executed by the then record owners of more than threequarters (3/4) in area of said real property included
herein is recorded with the Summit County Recorder . .
There was no reference to association assessments in the
Forest Meadow CCRs. On July 20, 1971, plat D was signed by
Deseret and Security as owners, and on August 9, 1972, that
Forest Meadow Ranch plat was recorded (plat). The plat was
signed by Deseret Development by Jensen, President; Lee Ann
Hunter, secretary of Deseret; and by two Security Title Compan
employees as Trustees. The plat stated:
Know all men by these presents that we, the four
undersigned owners of the above described tract of
land, having caused the same to be subdivided into lots
& streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW
RANCH, PLAT M D " do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown on this plat as
intended for public use.
The plat further stated under the SUBDIVIDERS NOTE:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a
dedication of roads and street or rights of way to
public use. It is intended.that all streets shown
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider,
Deseret Diversified Development, Inc. - and shall be
completely maintained-by said owners.
Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association (Petitioner) w
formed as the homeowners association for the Forest Meadow
subdivision. Lot 105A-D is partly within the North half of
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and partly in the South half of said section.

0036 ri

owner of the land and the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners
Association and assigns would administer and enforce the CCRs.
The Forest Meadow CCRs further stated:
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon
all persons owning or occupying any lot, parcel or
portion of the real property enumerated at t h e _
beginning hereof until January 1, 1990, and for
successive twenty (20) year periods unless within six
(6) months of the end of the initial period or any
twenty (20) year period thereafter a written agreement
executed by the then record owners of more than threequarters (3/4) in area of said real property included
herein is recorded with the Summit County Recorder . .

There was no reference to association assessments in the
Forest Meadow CCRs. On July 20, 1971, plat D was signed by
Deseret and Security as owners, and on August 9, 1972, that
Forest Meadow Ranch plat was recorded (plat). The plat was
signed by Deseret Development by Jensen, President; Lee Ann
Hunter, secretary of Deseret; and by two Security Title Company
employees as Trustees. The plat stated:
Know all men by these presents that we, the four
undersigned owners of the above described tract of
land, having caused the same to be subdivided into lots
& streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW
RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown on this plat as
intended for public use.
The plat further stated under the SUBDIVIDERS NOTE:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a
dedication of roads and street or rights of way to
public use. It is intended, that all streets shown
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider,
Deseret Diversified Development, Inc. - and shall be
completely maintained.-by said owners.
Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association (Petitioner) was
formed as the homeowners association for the Forest Meadow
subdivision. Lot 105A-D is partly within the North half of
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and partly in the South half of said section.

0036 ri

On August 14, 1973, Jensen and Vincent B. Tolman created the
Pine Meadow Ranch Homeowners Association to act as the homeowners
association for the Pine Meadow Subdivision (Pine Meadows
Association).
On September 28, 1973, Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadows
Association recorded CCRs for the northern part of the
subdivision in the name of Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ...CEMRI CCRs) .
The PMRI CCRs state:
[A] 11 of the properties described above shall be held,
sold and conveyed subject to the following easements,
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for
the purpose of protecting the value and desirability
of, and which shall run with, the real property and be
binding on all parties having any right, title or
interest in the described properties or any part
thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall
inure to the benefit of each owner thereof.
The PMRI CCRs provided the rights of the Pine Meadows
Association, which include right to make assessments, lot owners
personal obligation to pay assessments and Respondent's ability
to impose liens against the property for failure to pay such
assessments.
Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always
shared a common water and roadway system.
On January 15, 1975, a special warranty deed was recorded to
convey title in Lot 105 from Security Title Company, Trustee to
Jensen Investment. Title conveyed was "subject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable
in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter."
On January 16, 1975, a deed was recorded from Jensen
Investment conveying the east half of lot 105A-D to Clifton Emmet
Clark and Sharon M. Clark (Clarks) by quitclaim deed. That same
day, another entry was made relating to the east half of Lot
105A-D, a conveyance by Jensen Investment to the Clarks of the
same portion by warranty deed. On July 23, 1975, the Clarks
reconveyed by quitclaim deed the east half of Lot 105A-D back to
Jensen Investment.
On July 22, 1975, recorded on July 23, 1975, Jensen
Investment conveyed by warranty deed Lot 105A-D to Harold E.
Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse (Waldhouses).

3
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On August 14, 1973, Jensen and Vincent B. Tolman created the
Pine Meadow Ranch Homeowners Association to act as the homeowners
association for the Pine Meadow Subdivision (Pine Meadows
Association).
On September 28, 1973, Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadows
Association recorded CCRs for the northern part of the
subdivision in the name of Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. 4£MRI CCRs).
The PMRI CCRs state:
[A]11 of the properties described above shall be held,
sold and conveyed subject to the following easements,
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for
the purpose of protecting the value and desirability
of, and which shall run with, the real property and be
binding on all parties having any right, title or
interest in the described properties or any part
thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall
inure to the benefit of each owner thereof.
The PMRI CCRs provided the rights of the Pine Meadows
Association, which include right to make assessments, lot owners
personal obligation to pay assessments and Respondent's ability
to impose liens against the property for failure to pay such
assessments.
Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always
shared a common water and roadway system.
On January 15, 1975, a special warranty deed was recorded to
convey title in Lot 105 from Security Title Company, Trustee to
Jensen Investment. Title conveyed was "subject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable
in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter."
On January 16, 1975, a deed was recorded from Jensen
Investment conveying the east half of lot 105A-D to Clifton Emmet
Clark and Sharon M. Clark (Clarks) by quitclaim deed. That same
day, another entry was made relating to the east half of Lot
105A-D, a conveyance by Jensen Investment to the Clarks of the
same portion by warranty deed. On July 23, 1975, the Clarks
reconveyed by quitclaim deed the east half of Lot 105A-D back to
Jensen Investment.
On July 22, 1975, recorded on July 23, 1975, Jensen
Investment conveyed by warranty deed Lot 105A-D to Harold E.
Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse (Waldhouses).
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Respondent claims that Pine Meadow Association and Forest
Meadow Association merged by majority shareholder vote on May 30,
1978 (the Association or Respondent). Petitioner disputes such
merger occurred because there are no certified copies of the
Articles of Merger from the Utah Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code. That dispute is not necessary to resolve in
this case.
Respondent claims that the record chain title owner at the
time of the merger, Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark
(Clarks), voted in favor of and supported the merger of the
Associations. Petitioner disputes this arguing that the Clarks
no longer owned the property at the time of the merger.
On December 12, 1988, recorded on December 13, 1988, the
Waldhouses conveyed by warranty deed title to 105A-D to Shelley
J. Oakason a/k/a Shelley J. Liftos (Oakason) reserving oil, gas,
and mineral rights.
On October 29, 1998, a warranty deed dated October 15, 1998,
was recorded conveying title from Oakason to Axel Grabowski
(Grabowski). Grabowski took title "[s]ubject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ."
On December 9, 1999, Grabowski conveyed title to Lot 105A-D
to Petitioner herein by quitclaim deed, which was recorded on
December 10, 1999. The named petitioner herein is made up only of
Grabowski.
Since the alleged merger, the Association has operated as
the homeowners' association for the 800 plus lots, homes and
cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions. Lot
ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association,
including assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the
Association's annual meetings. The Association has assessed lots
to pay for its operations and has received payment of assessments
from lot owners. Respondent claims that the primary
responsibility of the Association is to own, maintain and insure
the road system in the Pine Meadow Ranch area for the benefit of
all the Association's members and their invitees. Petitioner
disputes this and claims that the roads are owned by the lot
owners.
(Even if the roads are owned by the lot owners, the
issues here relate to whether the CCRs reflected the
Association's duty to own, maintain and insure the road system.)
The Association also owns, maintains and insures a
substantial amount of open space for the benefit of its members.
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In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to
establish the Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD")
for the provision of water service and the maintenance of
roadways in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the lot
owners. Predecessor owners of Forest Meadow Lot 105 paid taxes
to and received benefits from the SSD. The SSD was dissolved by
vote of the Summit County Commission in the spring of 2000. On
March 20, 2000, the SSD executed a "Deed of Easements conveying
to the Association, an easement for the operation and maintenance
of "public roads connecting such roads and ways to the Pine
Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions, including the road known
as Tollgate Canyon Road." "In Pine Meadow Ranch
Owners
Association,
Inc. v. Summit County,
Utah Third District Court,
Summit County, case no. 6181, the Court concluded that the roads
within Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions are private
roads, not public.
Since the conveyance from the SSD, the Association has
maintained, improved and insured the roadways in the Pine Meadow
and Forest Meadow subdivisions and has continued to own and
insure open space, and to extend power lines and provide other
benefits for its members. The Association has continued to
assess and receive payment for fees. The Association has spent
hundreds of thousands of dollars and currently has an annual
budget of $140,000.
On July 25, 1980, the Association republished the Forest
Meadow and PMRI CCRs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" (Lien
Notice). Petitioner disputes that the CCRs were merely to
confirm public notice of the CCRs, rather it expands the powers
of Respondent to make assessments. Since recording the Lien
Notice, the Association has continued to collect its assessments
and perform its other functions.
In 2003, the Association recorded a "Clarification of Notice
of Lien" (Clarification) confirming that the Lien Notice was
intended merely to republish the existing CCRs and other
encumbrances of record and not to create any new charge or
encumbrance on any property. Petitioner disputes that the
Clarification clarifies anything. Petitioner claims that the
Clarification is a new wrongful lien because by its terms it
makes a claim that Respondent has title to the roadways in
disregard of the rights of the lot owners who have record title
to the roads.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition to nullify
5
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wrongful liens against the Association with regard to the Notice
Lien. On March 20, 2000, the court heard oral arguments on the
sufficiency of the petition and affidavit under the Utah wrongful
lien statute. On March 27, 2000, the court ruled that
Petitioner's petition for summary relief be denied because if
Petitioner's claim was correct, then approximately 500 lots may
be similarly situated as Petitioner's lot 105A-D and the relief
requested exceeded the remedy of a summary proceeding because
Petitioner sought damages. The court entered- an Order on this
Ruling on May 18, 2000, and sua sponte
granted Petitioner leave
to amend as a non summary proceeding within thirty days.
On May 17, 2000, Petitioner filed an amendment to Petition
for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien pursuant to the Utah
wrongful lien statute, Utah Code § 38-9-1 et seq. modifying
Petitioner's prayer for relief to limit the petition to: (1) the
issue of whether the 1980 Notice Lien is a "wrongful lien" as
defined by the Utah Wrongful Line Statute and (2) if the court
finds it to be a wrongful lien, the issue of what relief is in
accordance with the facts and the law. Petitioner requested that
the court permit discovery limited to those issues and upon
completion of discovery the court hold a non-summary hearing on
those issues. Petitioner seeks a declaration that the CCRs
recorded in 1971 and 1973 are void and petitioner should not be
required to pay any assessments.
The parties engaged in discovery.
On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed its motion for summary
judgment.
On December 10, 2003, Respondent filed its cross motion for
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for
summary judgment.
On December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed its reply memoranda
in support of its motion for summary judgment. That same day,
Petitioner filed a motion to strike Respondent's cross motion for
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for
summary judgment because it failed to comply with former Utah R.
Jud. Adm. 4-501 (now known as Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)).
Specifically, Petitioner argued that Respondent's memoranda
failed to comply with the motion practice rule because it
combined its cross motion for summary judgment with its
opposition to Petitioner's motion.
On January 5, 2003, Respondent filed its opposition to
Petitioner's motion to strike. Respondent argued that for the
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sake of judicial economy and the parties, the court should allow
Respondent to respond in a combined memoranda.
On January 7, 2004, Petitioner filed its reply memorandum in
support of its motion to strike.
LAW
When both parties move for summary judgment, the court is
not bound to grant it to one side or another. Diamond T.
Utah,
Inc.
v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 441 P.2d 705 (1968). Cross motions
for summary judgment do not warrant the court's granting of
summary judgment unless one of the moving parties is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not genuinely
disputed. Amjacs Interwest,
Inc. v. Design Assocs.
, 635 P.2d 53
(Utah 1981) .
Cross motions may be viewed as involving a contention by
each movant that no genuine issues of material fact exists under
the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no dispute
remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. Nycalis
v.
Guardian
Title,
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); cert,
denied,
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). In effect, each cross movant implicitly
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but
that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist
that preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other
side.
Id.
The court has discretion to decide whether to allow
memoranda not in conformance with the rules.
Section 57-3-103 (2000) of the Utah Recording Act provides:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is
void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same
property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent
purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for
a valuable consideration, and (2) the subsequent
purchaser's document is first recorded.
Section 57-4a-4 provides:
A recorded document creates the following presumptions
regarding title to the real property affected: . . .
.(e) any necessary consideration was given; (f) the
grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest
created or described in the document acted in good
faith at all relevant times; . . . .
7
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Covenants that run with the land must have the following
characteristics: (1) the covenant must touch and concern the
land; (2) the covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run
with the land; and (3) there must be privity of estate.
Flying
Diamond Oil Corporation
v. Newton Sheep Company, 77 6 P.2d 618,
622-23 (Utah 1989). However, the law of covenant running with
the land has long been a source of some confusion. Id.
"For a
covenant to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land,
and there must be an intent that it run. Privity is not
required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant."
Id. at 623 n.6. Although the touch and concern and intent
requirements are somewhat Interrelated, the absence of any one of
the requirements prevents a covenant from running with the land.
Id. at 623.

Id.

Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or
users of the land, even though the covenant purports to
be a covenant that runs with the land. The effect of
the touch-and-concern requirement is to restrict the
types of duties and liabilities that can burden future
ownership of interests in the land. The touch-andconcern requirement focuses on the nature of the
burdens and benefits that a covenant creates. What is
essential is that the burdens and benefits created must
relate to the land and the ownership of an interest in
it; the burdens and benefits created are not the
personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant
that exist independently from the ownership of an
interest in. the land. . -. .
[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must
bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of
the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in
land may make because"' of his ownership right.
at 623-24.

The original parties to the covenant must have intended that
the covenant run with the land. Id. at 627. The parties intent
may be determined by an express statement in the document or
implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id.
At first
blush, a covenant to pay may appear personal, however, a promise
to pay may touch and concern the land if its purpose is to
benefit the covenantor's interest in the land, e.g., the
establishment of an easement may touch and concern the land, a
covenant to pay for the use of an easement may be part of a
covenant running with the land. Id. at 625.
Privity of estate is also required. Id. at 628. There are
three types of privity of estate: (1) mutual, e.g., a covenant
8

00373

arising from simultaneous interests in the same land; (2)
horizontal, e.g.,
a covenant created in connection with a
conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to another and
(3) vertical, e.g., the devolution of an estate burdened or
benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to a
successor. Id.
"[Vertical privity] arises when the person
presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the burden,
is a successor to the estate of the original person, .so benefitted
or burdened." Id.
A strict approach to privity has been
abandoned and substance prevails over technical form, e.g., a
homeowner's association which had no interest in property at all
can sue to enforce a covenant.
Id.
Restrictive covenants that run with the land a!nd
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual
lot owners; * therefore, interpretation of the covenants
is governed by the same rules of construction as those
used to interpret contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson,
998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000).
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity
against all those who take the estate with notice of
them, although they may not be, strictly speaking, real
covenants so as to run with the land or of a nature to
create a technical qualification of the title conveyed
by the deed. The question is not whether the covenant
runs with the land, but whether a party will be
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with
the contract entered into by his or her vendor, where
the purchase was made with notice of such covenant.
The enforcement of restrictive covenants or equitable
servitudes is based on the principle of notice; that
is, a person taking title to land with notice of a
restriction upon it will not, in equity and good
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction. .
Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive
covenant imposed in furtherance of a building or
development scheme, on the part of one against whom
enforcement is sought is essential. Accordingly,
restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision
embraced by a general plan of development can be
enforced against a subsequent purchaser who takes title
to the land with notice of the restriction. . . .
A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants
upon land is bound by such restrictions, although they
are not such as in strict legal contemplation run with
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the land. Thus, even though a covenant does not run
with the land, it may be enforceable against a
transferee of the covenantor who takes with knowledge
of its terms under circumstances which would make it
inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction.
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice
not merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee
of the party who made., the agreement, but becauaa he or
she has taken the estate with notice of a valid
agreement concerning it. The enforcement against a
purchaser with notice rests upon the principle, that it
would be inequitable to permit such an owner, while
enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the grant,
part of the consideration for which was the benefit
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by
violating the covenant. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants §§ 266-67(1995).
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner argues that Deseret did not have record title to
Lot 105 at the time it recorded Forest Meadows CCRs to the
property, therefore, having no recorded deed to the property it
was unable to bind the lot with CCRs that would run with the
land. When Deseret recorded the CCRs in 1971, it had notice that
record title to the land was held by Security. If Deseret wanted
to bind the lot with covenants running with the land, it knew to
obtain a deed and record it, but failed to do so. Therefore,
Petitioner argues that Petitioner's chain of title is superior to
Respondent's and the CCRs do not apply to Petitioner. Petitioner
argues that only if Deseret had fee simple title could it bind
the land with such covenants. Because Deseret had no privity of
estate, it could not bind the land. Petitioner argues that
Security was listed as Trustee in the 1965 warranty deed from
Bates, and because there are no contemporaneous documents showing
Security was Trustee for Deseret, the court is to disregard the
word "Trustee" and the court should simply read the 1965 warranty
deed to be from Bates to Security, who was the fee simple owner
in 1971 when Jensen and Deseret purported to create the CCRs.
Petitioner calls this the doctrine of "descriptio personae."
See, e.g., TWN, Inc.,
v. Mlchele,
66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003).
Petitioner also argues that the 1971 CCRs only covered a
portion of the development, and that in part is why other CCRs
were filed in 1973, and that act further indicates that the 1971
CCRs were not valid. Petitioner also argues that the attempt by
Respondent to have the court determine who could validly file
CCRs in 1971 and 1973 should be rejected because the CCRs and
10
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plats filed with the recorder do nothing more than give inquiry
notice that perhaps others, have an interest in the land.
However, without a deed, Deseret cannot be heard to claim they
owned the land such that they can bind it with CCRs.
Respondent argues that Petitioner lacks standing to
challenge the CCR's because it took title to Lot 105A-D subject
to easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record
from Grabowski, who received title from Oakson. Furthermore,
Respondent argues that the Petitioner's'predecessors paid
association dues and this confirms their acceptance of and
agreement with the CCR's. Respondent also argues that the Clarks
voted in favor of and supported the merger of associations.
Respondent argues that the recording of CCRs does not purport to
document conveyance of a property interest. Instead the CCRs are
a contract established by a prior owner which affects property
and is construed under the principles of contract law that such
restrictive covenants run with the land and encumber subdivision
lots form a contract between subdivision property owners as a
whole and individual lot owners. Moreover, Respondent argues
that restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity when a
purchaser has notice of such -covenants at the time of purchase.
Here, Petitioner had notice of the CCRs and Lien Notice prior to
receiving its property interest in 105A-D, therefore, it took
such interest subject to the CCRs. Respondent argues that
Petitioner has not offered any evidence to overcome the
presumption that Deseret was owner or developer at the time the
CCRs were recorded. Respondent argues that the recorded
subdivision plat confirms that Deseret and Security had mutuality
of estate and interest in the ownership of Lot 105 which is
presumed to be true because it is a recorded document and
Petitioner fails to rebut that presumption. Respondent footnotes
that if the court grants Petitioner's petition that it will be
unable to do what it is supposed to by assessing fees and
maintaining the roads and common areas, therefore, the
subdivision will collapse and result in anarchy.
Petitioner replies that under Utah law,, the words "subject
to easements, restrictions and rights of way currently of record"
only limit the warranty given in a deed, they do not create any
interest. Such a phrase does not convey anything to anyone,
therefore, such phrase does not validate the 1971 CCRs. , Clarks'
vote on the merger is irrelevant because he did not own Lot 105AD at the time of the vote and the merger of the two homeowners'
associations had nothing to do with the validity of the 1971 CCRs
and the vote could not convey any interest in real property.
Petitioner also argues that the CCRs are an interest in real
property in the nature of an equitable servitude or real
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covenant, not as Respondent claims, merely a matter of contract.
Petitioner argues that actual notice is insufficient to validate
the CCRs, compliance with the Recording Act is required.
Petitioner also argues that equitable title to land by Deseret
through Security as Trustee is contrary to Utah law and factually
impossible because Deseret did not exist at the time that the
Bates conveyed title to Security. Petitioner argues that the
only way that Deseret could have acquired any intergjrt in the
land was by deed or written instrument, and if any such deed or
instrument ever existed, it is now void because it was not timely
recorded. Petitioner argues that in order for covenants to bind
a subsequent purchaser like Petitioner, there must be vertical
privity of estate between the owner who was originally bound by
them and the subsequent purchaser. Petitioner argues that the
CCRs are not binding on Petitioner because there is no vertical
privity of estate between -Deseret and Petitioner. Petitioner
asserts that the presumption of UCA 57-41-4 applies to the
warranty deed also, and it is at odds with the presumption
concerning the CCRs and so the deed should govern. Finally,
Petitioner argues that the court should reject Respondent's
argument that it must be able to make mandatory assessments or
the subdivisions will collapse because it is the classic
justification for tyranny.
DISCUSSION
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE.
CJA 4-501 was repealed effective November 1, 2003, and its
substance was enacted in URCP Rule 7(c). The court has
discretion in requiring compliance with the rules formerly and
even though now enacted in a rule of procedure, the court feels
the same. Although Rule 7 does not technically provide for an
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed combined
with a cross motion for summary judgment, the court agrees with
defendants that for judicial economy such is a practical
approach. The court will consider all of the pleadings of the
parties.
Therefore, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike.

2. CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
There appear to be factual disputes about some of those
issues, but the parties indicate and argue that there are no
facts to try. In part because of the age of these activities, the
parties agree that the court should and must decide these issues
12
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as a matter of law on the record before it.
(1) The court concludes that the cases relied on by
Petitioner do not govern this proceeding.
Petitioner relies upon TWN,. Inc.,
v. Michel,
supra,
66 P. 3d
1031, where parties both asserted ownership of a parcel that was
passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Riehard A
Christenson, Trustee" and -the other parcel passed to the other
party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A. Christensen." The
issue in TWN was whether a grantor's unexplained placing of the
word "trustee" next to his or her name on a real property deed
results, as a matter of law, in conveyance of only a trust
interest. The court concluded that the "descriptio personae"
doctrine applied which is when "certain terms sometimes added to
a person's name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended to
clarify the identity of the person, but their use or non-use
should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance."
Id. at 1033. The concept of descriptio personae has long been
recognized to the identification of parties on real property
deeds. Id. at 1034. The court concluded that the unexplained
word "trustee" on a real property deed does not, absent other
circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust,
create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Id.
The
Court also noted that UCA § 75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to
dispose of trust property "in the name of the trustee as
trustee." But something more is-required, e.g., "in my capacity
as trustee for the XYZ trust," or alternatively a party may
resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was iri fact
intended.
Here, there is no competing title interests in property.
There is no dispute that Petitioner is. the record title holder to
the property. It is undisputed that Petitioner's title traces
back to Security Title. It is undisputed that Security Title's
name is on the deed as trustee. However, here, other
circumstances exist that did not exist in TWN. Specifically, the
name of the trustee, Security Title, was one that would generally
be seen as a trustee, not a property owner. A title company
often holds title to property as trustee. Furthermore, the
recorded plat map reflected Deseret as the owner of the property
and Security Title as trustee. The recorded plat map clearly
reflects Security Title as the trustee of the property and
Deseret as owners of the property. Moreover, it is undisputed
that Deseret had recorded CCRs with protective covenants and
listed Deseret as owner of the land. The court concludes that
the word "trustee" under the circumstances surrounding this case
reflected the existence of a trust and that Deseret was the
13
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beneficiary and owner of the property.
Petitioner also relies upon Dunlap v. Stichting
Mayflower
Mountain
Fonds,
76 P.3d 711 (Utah App. 2003), where the parties
both asserted ownership of a mining claim through differing
chains of title. Here, as previously stated there is no
competing title interest. There is no dispute that Petitioner is
the record title holder to the property.
Petitioner also relies upon Flying
Diamond Oil Corp. v.
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). In that case,
the parties conflict involved an agreement regarding the surface
right of land. The court concluded that the agreement governing
the surface right of the land created a covenant, which ran with
the land because it touched and concerned the land, it was the
intent of the original parties, there was privity of estate, and
the agreement was in writing. Petitioner argues that here, there
is no privity of estate.
The court is not persuaded.. Applying substance over form,
there is vertical privity of estate. As stated above, under the
circumstances, it is clear that Security Title was Trustee for
Deseret. Deseret recorded^the CCRs as owner. Petitioner's
successor in interest received title from Security Title as
Trustee for Deseret. Deseret expressly stated that "the
reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out are to run
with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or
occupying any lot . . . ." Later, Pine Meadow's CCRs expressly
stated that "all of the properties . . . shall be held, sold and
conveyed subject to the following easements, restrictions,
covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of
protecting the value and desirability of, and which shall run
with, the real property." Clearly, these covenants touched and
concerned the land and the express intent was for them to do so.
Accordingly, as in Flying
Diamond,
the CCRs run with the land and
Petitioner is bound by them.
The basic argument by the Association is that competing
titles are not involved in those cases, and here title is clear
in Petitioner, but such title is burdened by the prior recorded
covenants.
The court agrees that this fact situation is not one of
competing titles. The warranty deed of 1965 indeed names
Security Title as Trustee and it does not name who it is trustee
for. However, other documents, some executed by Security Title,
later demonstrate that the CCR's signed by Jensen on behalf of
Deseret show Security believed it was fee simple owner only for
14
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Deseret, even though Deseret did not exist in 1965. Extraneous
and reasonably contemporaneous evidence shows that Security was
not the intended owner in fee simple and the word Trustee by its
name does more than describe Security. It shows Security's
interest and while it alone does not create a trust interest,
other evidence and documents show Deseret had an interest in the
land. Deseret has not attempted to do anything to the land
inconsistent with its own ownership interest. Security could have
done the same thing to the land. Deseret does not claim title.
It merely encumbered the land which it could do as owner. Title
companies are in the business of holding title in trust for
someone or some other entity. The CCRs here make clear that
anyone who buys this land takes it subject to certain
restrictions, which is again not out of the ordinary. Deseret
has done more than merely "claim" an interest in the land. That
claim was verified and confirmed by the trustee Security when it
signed the plat.
(2) The court does not accept the "anarchy" argument of
Respondent, but does believe that because assessments have been
ongoing for many years, and because Respondent has been
maintaining roads and open spaces, and because property owners
have been paying assessments to the SSD and to respondent since
dissolution of the SSD, Petitioner's claim must fail. Clearly,
the covenants touch and concern the land. Petitioner's
predecessors in interest benefitted from those roads and open
spaces. Petitioner benefits from the work of the Association. It
is clear that Deseret's intent was for the roads and open spaces
to benefit the subsequent property owners .of the subdivided
property. As stated above, vertical privity exists.
Nevertheless, even if there was no vertical privity, as a matter
of equity, the court agrees with Respondent that prior
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants
that run with the land and so must Petitioner. A challenge to
these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must be
barred.
(3) Property law does not fully govern here, but contract
principles emerge and where Petitioner bought the land with
notice it did so subject to certain restrictions, Petitioner
ought to be bound by those restrictions. Prior to subdividing
the property Deseret recorded the plats and CCRs. The initial
transfer from Security Title was granted in 1975. This was
several years after the plats and CCRs were recorded.
Petitioner's predecessors in ..interest paid the assessments and
enjoyed the roads and open spaces as a result thereof.
Petitioner has also had the right to enjoy the roads and open
spaces. There is no dispute that Petitioner had notice of the
15
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restrictions at the time it received the property. Moreover,
Petitioner took the property by quit claim deed from Grabowski
who took the property "[s]ubject to easements, restrictions and
rights of way appearing of record. . . ." For Petitioner now to
claim that those restrictions should not apply to it is not
persuasive. The restrictions were recorded long before
Petitioner obtained title. It would be inequitable to permit
Petitioner, while enjoying the fruits of such restrictions, to
not. comply with the restrictions when Petitioner had notice of
them at the time it obtained -title.
(4) Petitioner claims ownership of a lot of land conveyed
by Deseret. At the same time Petitioner claims that CCRs created
by Deseret do not apply to Petitioner. As discussed in (1), (2)
and (3), the court does not agree.
Based on the above, the court DENIES the motion for summary
judgment of Petitioner and GRANTS the motion of Respondent for
summary judgment.
Respondent is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) .
DATED this

day of

^w^4

2004.

BY TH

DISTRICT COURT JUDm^TnicT^
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 000600092 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this 3<?JyJt day of

/%frv^<C

NAME
EDWIN C BARNES
ATTORNEY DEF
201 S MAIN ST 13TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84111-2216
BOYD KIMBALL DYER
ATTORNEY PLA
664 NORTHCLIFFE CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84103
', 2 0 0 ^ .

Page 1 (last)
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Pine Meadow Ranch Association
1104 Ashton Avenue #203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

H
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NOTICE OF LIEN
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations
and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971
and filed for record July 22, 1971 as entry No. 113593, Book No.
M32 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State
of Utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch", dated August 15, 1973
and filed for record on September 28, 1973 as entry 120967, Book No. M-50,
office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah,
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation,
claims a continuing lien upon the following described real property
for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share
fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any
or all of said items:
Plat A, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 81
Plat B, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 49
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 05
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through 14
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat B, Lots 15 through 39
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C, Lots 40 through 06
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat 0, Lots 86 through 181
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of
any said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadow Ranch Association, 1104 Ashton
Avenue, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating that all
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser
may be responsible for payment of prior delinquent assessments.
Dated:
Pine Meadow Ranch Association
By:

'$£&

M. -P- «HfWQ^

It'bV President
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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On the
/&"~
&'~
day of
y?££^£— , 1980, personally appeared
before me Geraldd P. Lang ton, the/ sWner of the foregoing instrura^nt,
who duly acknowledg
ledged to me tha^t he executed the same. ..••"\i» T. -•/.'•*.•
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